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I. INTRODUCTION 
Domestic law scholars and policymakers have long debated issues 
surrounding privatization.1 Over the past twenty years, the U.S. government 
has increasingly contracted with private organizations to perform a variety of 
functions—from health care, 2  to education, 3  to welfare, 4  to prison 
                                                                                                                               
 
 † Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Article was first presented at a 
Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues of International Law, sponsored by the American Society of 
International Law, in The Hague, Netherlands in July 2005. The ideas contained here were also 
presented at a faculty workshop at George Washington University Law School, and at a conference on 
“The Future of the State in International Law,” held at the University of Virginia School of Law. I 
acknowledge the participants in all three events for helpful comments and suggestions. In addition, 
special thanks go to Dan Bedansky, Paul Schiff Berman, Rosa Brooks, Nestor M. Davidson, Robert W. 
Gordon, John Harrison, Paul Kahn, Harold Hongju Koh, David Luban, Jordan Paust, Leila Sadat, Steven 
Schooner, and Dinah Shelton for their useful contributions to this draft at various stages along the way. 
This Article was selected for inclusion in the Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum, held at Yale Law 
School in June 2006.
 1. A recent symposium issue of the Harvard Law Review even goes so far as to declare that 
we are in “an era of privatization.” See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1211 (2003). 
 2. See generally THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
PERSPECTIVES (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003). 
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=873086
384 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31: 383 
  
management.5 While advocates of privatization have generally argued for the 
practice on efficiency grounds,6 critics have worried that, even if privatization 
may cut financial costs, it can threaten important public law values.7 Because 
many constitutional norms protect individuals only from government 
misconduct,8 and because courts have been largely unwilling to view such 
norms as applicable to private contractors,9 these critics have argued that 
privatization will dramatically reduce the scope of public law protections in 
the United States. 10  Others have sought a middle ground, arguing that 
privatization offers a means to extend public law values through the 
government contracts themselves, in a process of “publicization.”11  
To date, however, none of these scholars has squarely confronted the 
growing phenomenon of privatization in the international realm or its impact 
on the values embodied in public international law. Yet, with both nation-
states and international organizations increasingly privatizing foreign affairs 
functions, privatization is now as significant a phenomenon internationally as 
it is domestically. For example, states are turning to private actors to perform 
                                                                                                                               
 3. See Pearl Rock Kane & Christopher J. Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of 
Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION 203 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001) (discussing rise of 
privatized education generally and noting that number of charter schools grew from two to nearly 2,500 
from 1992 to 2002). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2000) (authorizing implementation of welfare programs 
“through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations”); see also Pamela Winston et al., 
Privatization of Welfare Services: A Review of the Literature 3-6 (Mathematica Policy Research Inc., 
Reference No. 8834-002, 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/privatization02/report/pdf 
(discussing increase in private welfare providers). 
 5. See ALLEN J. BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 4 (2001) (reporting that private 
prison facilities held 76,010 inmates at mid-year 2000). 
 6. See, e.g., Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, 
Evidence, Prospects, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Winter 1997, at 67, 72-75 (arguing that privatization 
is efficient in a variety of contexts); F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter, What Does Private 
Management Offer Public Education?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271 (2000) (arguing for private 
management of “public” schools). 
 7. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 439 
(2005) (arguing that prison privatization undermines core public law values of humanity and 
parsimony); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (arguing 
that privatization can threaten public law values embodied in constitutional norms). 
 8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . .”) (emphasis added).
 9. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association is not a state actor); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee, a corporation 
created by federal statute and given control over U.S. participation in the Olympics as well as exclusive 
oversight of private amateur sports organizations participating in international competition, is not a state 
actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (holding that private nursing homes providing 
long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries are not state actors, even though they operate under contract 
with the government and make need determinations authorized by statute); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding that private schools are not state actors even though the government 
contracted with the schools to fulfill its statutory obligation to provide education to special-needs 
students). But see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) 
(holding that a private organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school athletic events is 
a state actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a private doctor treating prisoners 
pursuant to a contract with a prison is a state actor). 
 10. See Dolovich, supra note 7, at 446-50 (arguing that private prisons fail to fulfill society’s 
obligations to inmates); Metzger, supra note 7, at 1373-74. 
 11. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1285, 1300 (2003). 
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core military, foreign aid, and diplomatic functions. Military privatization 
entered the popular consciousness in early 2004, when private contractors 
working as interrogators and translators for the U.S. government abused 
detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.12 But this kind of military privatization 
is only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, though the United States does not yet 
contract out direct combat functions, we now frequently turn to private actors 
to provide logistical support to those in combat on the battlefield as well as to 
aid in strategic planning and tactical advice.13 Other states, such as Sierra 
Leone, have used private contractors to engage in direct combat, 14  and 
international organizations have weighed the possibility of using private 
contractors to perform peacekeeping.15 In the foreign aid context, states and 
international organizations are increasingly entering into agreements with 
private non-profit and for-profit entities to deliver all forms of aid, including 
humanitarian relief, development assistance, and post-conflict 
reconstruction.16 Even diplomatic tasks such as peacekeeping negotiations are 
being undertaken by private actors in conjunction with governments and 
international organizations.17  
All of this privatization in the international sphere raises the same sort of 
question for international public law that domestic privatization raises for 
domestic public law: Will privatization erode fundamental public law values, 
such as human rights norms, norms against corruption and waste, and 
democratic process values?18 After all, international law norms, like many 
domestic constitutional norms, traditionally apply only to states. The 
Convention Against Torture, for example, generally prohibits only official 
                                                                                                                               
 
 12. See Douglas Jehl & Kate Zernike, Greater Urgency on Prison Interrogation Led to Use of 
Untrained Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at A11. 
 13. See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED 
MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003). 
 14. See Abraham McLaughlin, Guns for Hire Thrive in Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Mar. 15, 2004, at 6. 
 15. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 13, at 182-86. 
 16. See, e.g., BEYOND U.N. SUBCONTRACTING: TASK-SHARING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDING NGOS (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1998) [hereinafter U.N. 
SUBCONTRACTING]; Ian Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship Between 
Northern NGOs and Northern Governments, in STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT-NGO PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 7 (Ian Smillie & Henny Helmich eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
STAKEHOLDERS]. 
 17. See, e.g., James L. Taulbee & Marion V. Creekmore, NGO Mediation: The Carter Center, 
in MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOS 156 (Henry F. Carey & Oliver P. Richmond eds., 2003). 
 18. One can, of course, challenge the idea that certain values can even be labeled “public law 
values.” Indeed, as both critical legal studies and public choice theory teach, the line between the 
“public” and “private” is largely incoherent. Yet, that is precisely my point. Instead of seeing 
privatization solely as a threat to public values, as if there were some meaningful divide between the 
two, we should focus on the negotiated contractual relationships between the public and the private. As 
Jody Freeman has noted in discussing domestic privatization, “[t]he view that private actors . . . are 
menacing outsiders whose influence threatens to derail legitimate ‘public’ pursuits—features 
prominently in the dominant models of the field. And yet, private actors are also regulatory resources 
capable of contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy of administration. This realization suggests the 
possibility of harnessing private capacity to serve public goals.” Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-49 (2000). Similarly, I seek to use privatization 
contracts to pursue what are usually deemed the public ends of international law. 
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misconduct.19 Thus, we must ask: as more and more non-state contractors 
emerge on the international scene, will these individuals and groups 
necessarily fall through the cracks of international law and evade any public 
accountability? 
My answer to that question is “no,” and in this Article I suggest that the 
domestic U.S. administrative law literature may provide a useful set of 
responses to privatization that has been largely overlooked by international 
law scholars, policy-makers, and activists. In particular, I argue that 
possibilities for extending public law values inhere in the privatized 
relationship itself, particularly in the government contracts that are the very 
engine of privatization. Indeed, the contracts governments enter into with non-
state actors can include many provisions that would help to create both 
standards of behavior, performance benchmarks, and a means of providing 
some measure of public accountability. While such contractual provisions are 
not a panacea, they may be at least as effective as the relatively weak 
enforcement regime of public international law. 20  At the same time, by 
considering international privatization, I seek to open what I believe could be 
a fruitful dialogue between domestic administrative law scholars and 
international law scholars about possible responses. 
Significantly, while domestic scholars of privatization have not yet 
turned their attention to foreign affairs privatization, international law scholars 
have not really focused on privatization at all, and, in any event, have not 
seriously considered contract as a source of solutions to the potential threat to 
public law values that privatization may seem to pose. Of course, international 
law scholars have recognized concerns about how to apply international legal 
norms to non-state actors in general.21 But “non-state actors” is too broad a 
category because a private contractor is very different from, say, a guerrilla 
soldier. In particular, because privatization involves an increasing contractual 
relationship between governments (or international organizations) and private 
actors, contractual mechanisms for importing public accountability are 
potentially available with regard to privatization, whereas they obviously are 
                                                                                                                               
 
 19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14 (defining torture as 
certain activities designed to inflict pain or suffering when such “pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity”). Of course, this international “state action” requirement can be challenged on a 
variety of grounds. See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.  
 20. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, in considering the question of whether privatization 
undermines international law’s public values, we need to recognize that it is not as if state actors are 
always held accountable for failing to uphold these values. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for 
Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 135 (2005). After all, international law has often been criticized for having relatively 
weak enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17, 18-20 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) 
(noting lack of enforcement in international human rights law). And while this fact may not be cause for 
celebration, it does serve to remind us that we do not quite lose as much when we privatize in the 
international sphere as we do when, for example, we privatize domestically. 
 21. See, e.g., PHILIP ALSTON, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); Math 
Noortman, Non-State Actors in International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 59, 71-72 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001). 
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not relevant to many other instances in which non-state actors play a role in 
the international sphere.  
Moreover, to the extent that international law scholars and policy-
makers have proposed any solutions to potential problems created by 
privatization, these proposals fall far short. At the extreme, some have argued 
that the best response to military outsourcing, for example, is simply to 
oppose it altogether, because military functions are somehow “inherently” 
governmental or because state bureaucracies can be better monitored and held 
to account in court than private contractors can.22 However, those who simply 
resist privatization are misguided because the trend toward outsourcing of 
foreign affairs functions previously performed by state bureaucracies (at least 
in the recent past) is probably irreversible. The privatization train has not only 
already left the station, but has gone far down the track. Indeed, even those 
who seek to send the train back home should favor alternative solutions in the 
interim, because any return is likely to take a very long time.  
Others have argued that private actors with significant impact in the 
international sphere should be more formally brought within the normative 
framework of international law. Thus, with each wave of non-state actors—
such as guerrilla movements,23 terrorists,24 non-governmental organizations,25 
and corporations26—many international law practitioners and scholars have 
considered expanding the coverage of public international law to apply to 
each group. They have therefore contended either that states should (by treaty 
or customary international law) develop new norms that apply directly to 
these categories of non-state actors,27 or that any “state action” requirements 
contained in existing norms (again either in treaties or customary international 
law) should be interpreted expansively to apply to non-state actors linked to 
the state.28 At the same time, these scholars and practitioners have tended to 
focus on the need for courts and tribunals—in many cases new ones—to apply 
and interpret these norms.  
                                                                                                                               
 
 22. John Sifton, Remarks on Private Military Contractors at Conference at Georgetown 
University Law Center (Apr. 2005). 
 23. See, e.g., Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 29, 
30-33 (1983). 
 24. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 756-57 (2004). 
 25. See, e.g., Noortman, supra note 21, at 72. 
 26. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 524-30 (2001) (arguing that more international law norms should be 
extended to bind corporations directly); see also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2003) (same). But see Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect 
Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005) (urging 
caution). 
 27. See Junod, supra note 23, at 34-38 (discussing guerrillas and insurgents); Noortmann, 
supra note 21, at 71-74 (discussing the “legal personality” of NGOs under international law); Ratner, 
supra note 26, at 524-27 (discussing corporations).  
 28. See, e.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 
4, 8, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (stating that the “conduct of any State organ shall be considered an 
act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s conduct shall be attributed to the state if he 
or she is acting on the state’s instructions or under the state’s direction). 
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Yet this approach, though it is important because it results in the 
articulation of norms in the international sphere, can have only a limited 
effect. Even if the proposed courts and tribunals are established and fully 
functioning, and even if they expand the norms of international law to apply to 
the broad range of privatized action, these tribunals will never have the 
capacity to hold more than a limited number of individuals (and groups) to 
account. Accordingly, we need to seek alternative mechanisms for extending 
and implementing public law values to privatized actors in the international 
sphere. And though literature on corporate responsibility,29  NGOs,30  soft 
law,31 and transnational networks32 has attempted to address some informal 
modes of accountability, international law scholars have so far not sufficiently 
discussed the possibility of contract. 
This Article begins by laying out the scope of the problem, surveying the 
extent of foreign affairs privatization, the potential threat it poses to public 
law values, and the failure of current outsourcing contracts to address this 
problem. Using Iraq as a case study, I examine the publicly available military 
contracts as well as contracts to provide foreign aid, and I suggest serious 
deficiencies in the contracts thus far. Then, drawing on examples and insights 
from the domestic privatization literature, I set forth nine ways in which 
contractual provisions could be used to extend and enforce public law values 
in the foreign affairs privatization context. Specifically, I suggest that 
contracts be drafted to: explicitly extend relevant norms of public international 
law to private contractors, delineate training requirements, provide for 
enhanced monitoring both within the government and by independent third-
party monitors, establish clear performance benchmarks, require accreditation, 
mandate self-evaluation by the contractors, provide for governmental 
takeovers of failing contracts, include opportunities for public participation in 
the contract negotiation process, and enhance whistleblower protections and 
rights of third-party beneficiaries to enforce contractual terms. And, because 
these public values would be embodied in that quintessential private law 
instrument—the contract—they would more readily come within the purview 
of domestic courts or private arbitral bodies and so would rely less on 
international public law enforcement mechanisms (though those are possible 
as well). As a result, these contractual provisions may at least make some 
progress in attempting to ensure that private contractors are accountable both 
to the publics they serve and to those who are most affected by their work. 
                                                                                                                               
 
 29. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 952-58 (2004); Sean 
Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 
389, 424-30 (2005); Ratner, supra note 26, at 531-34; Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility 
and the International Law of Human Rights: The Next Lex Mercatoria, in ALSTON, supra note 21, at 
177-226.
 30. See Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical 
Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE U.N., AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 40-43 (Leon 
Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 1996) [hereinafter GLOBAL GOVERNANCE].
 31. See DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING 
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2003).
 32. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
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Of course, one might think that these proposals are unrealistic because 
one of the main reasons governments privatize is precisely to avoid the kind 
of accountability I propose. Yet governments are not monolithic, and there are 
undoubtedly many people within bureaucracies, such as contract monitors, 
who honestly wish to do their job and would therefore welcome (and lobby 
for) contractual mechanisms that increase accountability. In addition, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations can 
sometimes pressure states to adopt oversight regimes such as the ones I 
discuss. The problem is that the policymakers and scholars have not 
sufficiently focused on privatization or the possible accountability 
mechanisms that could be embodied in contracts. Thus, this Article seeks both 
to raise awareness about the ways in which contractual provisions might 
embody public law values and to stimulate a broader-ranging debate about the 
best way to respond to privatization in the international context. 
II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIVATIZATION AND THE THREAT TO PUBLIC LAW 
VALUES 
 States and international organizations are increasingly turning to private 
entities, both for-profit and non-profit, to fulfill a broad range of foreign 
affairs functions. Just as they are contracting with private organizations to 
provide domestic services such as welfare, health care, education, and prison 
management, they are also outsourcing military and intelligence activities, 
foreign aid, and diplomatic tasks. Yet, until recently, this trend has largely 
escaped scholarly attention. Moreover, to the extent that scholars have 
addressed this issue, they have not examined the full scope of privatization 
across a number of different areas of state activity.33 This Part briefly maps 
out the broad-ranging nature of foreign affairs privatization and then discusses 
the dangers such outsourcing poses to public law values.  
                                                                                                                               
 
 33. To date, military/security privatization has generated the most scholarly attention. See 
generally SINGER, supra note 13; Tina Garmon, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: 
Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 325 (2003); Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call To Recognize and Regulate 
Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2003); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The 
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 
(2004); Peter Warren Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004); Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a 
New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World 
Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75 (1998). Other scholars have focused on privatized foreign aid. See 
Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 30, at 1; Smillie, supra note 16, at 7. However, not only do these 
specialized studies necessarily tell only part of the story, they do not systematically explore the 
possibility of using contractual mechanisms to hold private actors accountable, nor do they draw on the 
domestic administrative law literature on privatization. At the same time, domestic administrative law 
scholars have not generally applied their insights to the international context, though there are important 
exceptions. See generally, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM 154-55 (2004) (identifying the democracy deficit created by 
privatization and situating that deficit within a global context); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: 
How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy, 46 B.C. 
L. REV. 989 (2005) (identifying the problems of military privatization).  
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A. The Scope of Foreign Affairs Privatization: Military, Foreign Aid, and 
Diplomatic Functions 
 The degree to which states and international organizations have farmed 
out foreign affairs activities to private actors is truly breathtaking. It would not 
be an exaggeration to say that the U.S. government has hired private entities 
to help fight our wars, to deliver much of our foreign aid, and to play an 
important role mediating our conflicts and engaging in other diplomatic 
activities. Many other states are pursuing a similar course. International 
organizations are likewise turning to private entities to support peacekeeping 
and to deliver all manner of humanitarian, development, and post-conflict 
reconstruction assistance, as well as to participate in peacemaking 
negotiations. 
 The privatization of military functions is perhaps the most remarkable 
example. Probably no function of government is deemed more 
quintessentially a “state” function than the military protection of the state 
itself, and some scholars of privatization in the domestic sphere have assumed 
that the military is one area where privatization does not, or should not, 
occur.34 Indeed, some have argued that, by hiring private armies to keep itself 
secure, the state would threaten its own existence because it would have no 
way to control these private military actors.35  
 Yet, governments around the world, including the United States, are 
increasingly hiring private military companies to perform core military 
functions.36 For decades, of course, the U.S. government has entered into 
agreements with private companies to build weapons and other equipment, as 
well as to provide the basic goods necessary to run a government agency—
everything from desks to office supplies.37 However, such contracting activity 
now covers services to active troops in the field.38 These activities include not 
only support services, such as food, accommodations, and sanitation for 
troops on the battlefield, but also core functions such as intelligence gathering, 
communications, weapons maintenance, and even troop training.39 According 
to one commentator, “while contractors have long accompanied U.S. armed 
forces, the wholesale outsourcing of U.S. military services since the 1990s is 
unprecedented.”40  
 Indeed, if one looks to U.S. forces deployed on the battlefield, the ratio 
of private contractors to troops has increased dramatically in the past fifteen 
                                                                                                                               
 
 34. Cf. Freeman, supra note 11, at 1295, 1300. 
 35. See, e.g., Rosky, supra note 33, at 882-83 (stating that a state in which the supply of 
military force is entirely private is more vulnerable to military revolt than one in which the supply of 
military force is entirely public and that “the intensity of force justifies the state’s monopoly of the 
supply of force”). 
 36. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 3-17.  
 37. See Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 369, 371-72 (2004). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 416 n.312. 
 40. SINGER, supra note 13, at 16. 
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years. In the first Gulf War, the ratio was roughly one to one hundred;41 in the 
current war in Iraq, the ratio is one to ten.42 Although the United States has 
not yet used the employees of private companies in actual combat roles,43 it 
has deployed them to fulfill tasks such as military intelligence gathering, troop 
training, weapons maintenance, and support functions that are very close to 
combat; these private actors even have the power to wield force in a variety of 
circumstances.44  Other countries, such as Sierra Leone and Angola, have 
explicitly hired private armies.45  In many modern conflicts, these private 
military companies have played a decisive role.46
 The pervasiveness of the U.S. military’s use of contractors captured 
media attention with news of their role in Iraq. When stories surfaced that 
U.S. military personnel had abused detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, it 
soon became clear that private contractors employed by CACI, Inc. and 
working under an agreement with the Department of the Interior had 
participated in the abuse.47 Indeed, intelligence operatives may actually have 
given orders to uniformed military. 48  Translators hired under a similar 
contract with the firm Titan, Inc. were also implicated in the abuse.49 News of 
gruesome security contractor killings by Iraqi insurgents has sparked 
additional popular attention.50
 Yet, CACI is not an anomaly. Firms such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root 
(KBR) have for years built and maintained military bases, transported troops 
and equipment to and on the battlefield, repaired and maintained roads and 
vehicles, distributed water and food to troops, washed laundry, refueled 
equipment, attended to hazardous materials, and performed related 
environmental services,51 earning roughly $1.7 billion annually from military 
                                                                                                                               
 
 41. George Cahlink, Army of Contractors, GOV’T EXEC, Feb. 1, 2002, at 43, available at 
http://www.govexec.com/features/0202/0202s5.htm. 
 42. Singer, supra note 33, at 523. 
 43. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, first issued in 1966 and revised as 
recently as 2003, requires agencies to outsource all functions that are not “inherently-governmental.” 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-76, 
PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 1-3 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
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outsourced, however, and such functions include combat positions. See Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: 
An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 233, 256-58 (2000).  
 44. Vernon, supra note 37, at 407-09.  
 45. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, ECONOMIST, July 29, 1995, at 32. 
 46. See Zarate, supra note 33, at 94-97. 
 47. See MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY 
POLICE BRIGADE, 26, 36, 48 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]; SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF 
COMMAND 32-34, 61 (2004); Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15.  
 48. HERSH, supra note 47, at 61. 
 49. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 47, at 26, 36, 48; Brinkley & Glanz, supra note 47, at 
A15. 
 50. James Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, for Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at 
A1. 
 51. See, e.g., Halliburton Company, About KBR, http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/aboutKBR/ 
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work.52 Beyond this logistical support, other companies provide core military 
functions such as troop training and intelligence gathering. For example, since 
1996, another U.S company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated 
(MPRI) has run the ROTC training programs at universities around the 
country and has played a key role in numerous programs to educate U.S. 
forces, including officer training, war gaming, and tactical planning.53  In 
recent years, moreover, MPRI has expanded its services to a wide variety of 
countries, including Croatia, Bosnia, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea,54 as well as to regional intergovernmental 
programs such as the African Crisis Response Initiative.55 Finally, and most 
controversially, military companies have provided direct combat services. For 
example, the now-dissolved South African company Executive Outcomes, 
which drew its personnel largely from the apartheid-era South African 
Defense Force, won contracts with governments in Angola, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, Congo, and others to engage in 
direct combat during the 1980s and 1990s.56 Indeed, its activities in Sierra 
Leone and Angola are widely believed to have altered the outcome of the 
conflicts in those states.57  
 Although privatization in the military context has received far more 
attention, overseas aid is another area in which states are also increasingly 
turning to private contractors to fulfill functions formerly performed directly 
by the state.58 From emergency humanitarian relief, to long-term development 
assistance, to post-conflict reconstruction programs, private actors under 
contract with the United States, other governments, and international 
organizations are taking a larger and larger role. The most dramatic surge in 
privatized aid has involved humanitarian relief. The United States, for 
example, has contracted with private companies such as KBR to build refugee 
camps,59 and with nonprofit NGOs such as Save the Children to deliver relief 
supplies and medical services.60 For fiscal year 2003, the USAID Office of 
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance spent sixty-six percent of its nearly $300 
million budget through NGOs. 61 Other countries and international 
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 52. SINGER, supra note 13, at 139. 
 53. See News Release, Army Reserve 88th Regional Readiness Command, Team MPRI 
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 54. SINGER, supra note 13, at 130-32. 
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 56. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, supra note 45, at 32. 
 57. See Zarate, supra note 33, at 94-97. 
 58. Ian Smillie, United States, in STAKEHOLDERS, supra note 16, at 253. 
 59. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 144. 
 60. See USAID, DCHA/PVC-ASHA PORTFOLIO, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at B-5 (2005), available 
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 61. USAID OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2003), 
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organizations are similarly turning to NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid.62 
Longer-term development aid has followed a similar trend. By the mid-1980s, 
development agencies had begun to shift their focus from general funding for 
foreign governments to more targeted direct support both to grassroots 
organizations helping to eradicate poverty and to other civil society 
institutions seen as necessary for democracy and development.63 In the United 
States, for example, the government now uses both international and foreign 
NGOs to deliver much of its aid overseas, rather than providing aid directly to 
foreign governments.64 As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan make clear, 
privatization is also taking place in the arena of post-conflict reconstruction, 
with multimillion dollar contracts awarded not only to nonprofit organizations 
but to for-profit corporations as well.65 Indeed, so far in Iraq USAID has 
awarded fifteen contracts worth a total of $3.2 billion to for-profit companies, 
while it has awarded only six grants worth $40 million to nonprofit 
organizations.66  
 In addition to military and foreign assistance functions, governments 
have also turned to private entities to assist in peacemaking and other 
diplomatic tasks. The Carter Center, probably the best-known organization in 
this field, has engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts to avoid or end 
conflicts at the behest of governments around the world.67 For example, in 
1994, former President Carter assisted the U.S. government in reopening talks 
with North Korea, negotiating an agreement for the peaceful departure of 
Raoul Cedras from power in Haiti (thereby averting the need for increased 
U.S. military intervention), and also brokering a ceasefire in Bosnia.68 More 
recently, the Center has engaged in peacemaking activities at the request of 
                                                                                                                               
 
 62. Smillie, supra note 16, at 9 (describing foreign aid in France, Sweden, and the EU); see 
also Andrew S. Natsios, NGOs and the U.N. System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or 
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numerous governments, including Uganda, Sudan, and Ecuador. 69  Other 
organizations have performed similar roles around the world.70
 Finally, it is important to note that, in addition to states, international 
organizations such as the United Nations have also turned to private entities.71 
For example, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) has entered partnerships with hundreds of NGOs around 
the world for services including refugee protection, community services, field 
security, child protection, engineering, and telecommunications in emergency 
relief situations. 72  Although the United Nations has not deployed private 
military firms in combat roles,73 some policymakers and commentators have 
suggested that such a step would provide badly needed help to peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement operations.74 And even those who do not endorse a 
direct combat role for private firms nonetheless argue that the United Nations 
should privatize military logistics functions, much as the U.S. government has 
done.75  
 To be sure, one might argue that privatization in all of these areas of 
foreign affairs is nothing new. With respect to the military, mercenaries 
(loosely defined as soldiers working for private gain) have appeared 
throughout history. From the Swiss guards of the Middle Ages, to the 
merchant-armies of the British and Dutch East India Companies during the 
colonial period, to the privateers of early America, to the French Foreign 
Legion still active today, mercenaries have played a significant role over the 
centuries. 76  Indeed, before the Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the 
emergence of the state system that eventually gave rise to large standing 
national armies, mercenaries were the norm rather than the exception.77 By the 
twentieth century, however, apart from some post-colonial wars of 
independence (where mercenaries often fought against national liberation 
movements), the bulk of military security work has been performed by 
professionalized, bureaucratized armies and not private actors.78 It is against 
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this backdrop that we have seen, over the past two decades, the increasing re-
privatization of military functions. 
 Likewise, the privatization of foreign aid and diplomacy are not wholly 
recent developments. With respect to foreign aid, private groups from the 
United States funneled aid overseas for specific causes long before the 
government developed foreign assistance programs.79 Indeed, the practice of 
government-sponsored foreign assistance did not develop in a significant way 
in the United States until the initiation of the Marshall Plan during the period 
following World War II.80 However, from the 1950s through the 1970s, much 
of the aid consisted of direct grants to needy countries.81 In contrast, as noted 
previously, over the past two decades the government has delivered more and 
more foreign aid through nongovernmental actors. 82  And with respect to 
diplomacy, private organizations have long played a role in ongoing peace 
negotiations and other efforts, but the high-level diplomatic work of 
organizations such as the Carter Center is new and distinctive.83
 The forces driving this trend toward privatization are not fully 
understood, but the dominant rationale articulated by most scholars of the 
subject is the promise of cutting costs.84  The government need not offer 
pensions or benefits to employees of private companies working under 
contract, and it can hire contractors on a short-term basis, thereby decreasing 
the size of government bureaucracies. Moreover, unlike many governmental 
employees, private contractors are typically not unionized. The lack of 
unionization fuels the political support of those on the right, and, at least in the 
United States, there tends to be broad bi-partisan support for any trend that 
seems to make government “smaller” and “more efficient.” In addition, in the 
case of the military, private military companies may offer governments 
greater flexibility. Such companies are touted for their ability to work 
quickly,85 and in states with ill-equipped, poorly functioning militaries, private 
companies can provide badly needed expertise to help train, or even replace, 
                                                                                                                               
 
 79. The international non-governmental organization movement has its roots in missionary 
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government troops. 86  Using private military companies can also offset 
shortages of troops by offering a rapid means of growing a state’s military 
capacity, and states can deploy their forces with lower domestic political costs 
because fewer uniformed troops are put at risk, thus keeping official casualty 
figures down. 87  Finally, some have suggested that the growth of private 
military firms has been fueled in part by the labor pool created as many 
military dictatorships and their accompanying security forces have been 
dismantled during transitions to democracy.88
 Foreign aid privatization also appears to be motivated largely by a desire 
to cut costs. Certainly in the United States the outsourcing of aid is linked to 
the political push for smaller government, combined with weak political 
support for foreign aid generally. Indeed, USAID, perhaps motivated in part 
by the need to justify its activities to an increasingly skeptical Congress, was 
one of the first agencies in the United States to take then-Vice President Al 
Gore’s “Reinventing Government” message to heart, declaring in 1994 that 
“USAID is now fully committed to reinventing itself as a more efficient, 
effective, and results-oriented organization.”89  
 The privatization of diplomatic tasks such as peacemaking has received 
even less scholarly attention than other forms of foreign affairs privatization, 
and the reasons behind this trend are thus even less clear. It appears, however, 
that the growing use of private entities in this arena has stemmed from the 
high-level experience of those such as former President Carter who have 
founded and worked for such organizations, as well as the organizations’ 
independence, which frees them from some of the political costs of sensitive 
diplomatic efforts.90
 Thus, the recent rise of privatization does represent a shift, at least as 
compared to the recent past, away from the large, highly-bureaucratized state. 
Just as states are outsourcing their domestic functions, they are also 
outsourcing their foreign affairs activities. And while the surge in foreign 
affairs privatization raises many questions that merit further study,91 a central 
issue presented by this trend is whether increased outsourcing undermines the 
public law values that apply primarily to state actors. 
                                                                                                                               
 
 86. See Garmon, supra note 33, at 331-34. 
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B. The Threat to Public Law Values 
 Just as the protections contained in the U.S. Constitution are generally 
viewed as prohibitions on state misconduct only,92 the principal international 
human rights and humanitarian law instruments of the twentieth century—the 
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights,93 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,94 the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,95 the Genocide Convention,96 the Convention Against 
Torture,97 the Fourth Geneva Conventions,98 and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court99—were drafted primarily with states in mind. 
As such, at least in the conventional account of public international law, states 
are seen as both the primary parties to the treaties and the central bearers of 
rights and responsibilities. These instruments do grant individuals rights, of 
course—such as the right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or the right to a fair trial—but these are generally conceived 
primarily as rights against the state.100 Conversely, individuals can be held 
criminally liable, but usually only if some connection to the state is 
demonstrated. And while there are some exceptions within the overarching 
framework of public international law—for example, individuals can be 
convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity (as defined in the recent 
statute of the International Criminal Court) regardless of any connection to a 
state apparatus101—state action (or at least a link to it) still remains at the core 
of most conceptions of international law liability. 
 The private contractor interrogators and translators implicated in the 
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison provide a notable example of how these non-state 
actors might fall through the cracks of this traditional, state-centered approach 
to public international law. Although the Geneva Conventions and the 
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Convention Against Torture clearly prohibit any abuses committed by US 
military personnel, 102  the treaties’ applicability to non-state actors is 
ambiguous, and fora for holding non-state actors accountable are limited.103 
The U.S. government’s use of private contractors to transport terrorism 
suspects to countries known to practice torture104 has raised similar questions 
because again, while the Convention Against Torture prohibits governments 
from taking such actions, its applicability to private actors is ambiguous.105
 Private military companies engaging in direct combat also arguably fall 
through the cracks of current international law provisions, despite probably 
being the most notorious for committing atrocities. Although multiple treaties 
ban the use of certain categories of mercenaries outright, broad gaps in the 
definition of “mercenary” leave most types of work by private military 
companies outside the treaties’ prohibitions.106 For example, in Sierra Leone 
in the 1990s officers of Executive Outcomes, working under contract with the 
government, reportedly ordered employees carrying out air strikes against 
rebels to “[k]ill everybody,” even though the employees had told their 
superiors they could not distinguish between civilians and rebels.107 While 
such a command would almost certainly constitute a war crime if ordered by a 
military or civilian authority in the chain of command, it is less clear that such 
actions committed by private contractors would qualify, at least absent inquiry 
into the extent of the contractor’s link to the government.  
 Abuses committed by private actors who deliver aid also raise 
complicated questions about the application of international law. Although aid 
workers do not by any means regularly mistreat aid beneficiaries, such 
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 103. See Dickinson, supra note 20; see also Adam Liptak, Who Would Try Civilians from U.S.? 
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 106. See Milliard, supra note 33, at 19-69 (summarizing treaties). 
 107. Elizabeth Rubin, An Army of One’s Own, HARPER’S, Feb. 1997, at 48. 
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incidents occur more often than one might suspect. For example, employees 
of Dyncorp Inc., a private corporation that was charged with training police in 
Bosnia in the 1990s under a contract with the U.S. government, were 
“implicated in a sex-trafficking scandal” involving acts of rape, sexual abuse, 
and exploitation.108 Even staff members of not-for-profit organizations have at 
times been implicated in abuses. Indeed, a recent study of refugees and 
internally displaced persons in West African camps in Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone reported widespread rape and sexual exploitation of women and 
children by many actors, including aid workers. 109  The aid workers and 
peacekeeping forces allegedly relied on their positions of relative power to use 
“the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit the refugee 
population as a tool of exploitation.”110 In some camps, it appears that even 
necessities such as using a toilet were sometimes conditioned on the 
willingness to perform sexual favors.111 Although, as in the military context, 
such abuses committed by governmental actors generally violate international 
agreements, the same acts committed by non-state actors fall into a gray 
area.112
 Even outside the human rights context, the principal regional treaties 
seeking to deter corruption, for example, apply primarily to misconduct 
involving governmental actors. 113  Yet, foreign aid contractors have been 
implicated in fraud and waste. Indeed, Kellogg Brown & Root’s more than 
$10 billion in contracts with the U.S. government in Iraq “have been dogged 
                                                                                                                               
 
 108. Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19. Although Dyncorp offers security services under the 
contract, I include it and other such contracts within the foreign aid section because they provide 
assistance to a foreign country, as opposed to assistance to the U.S. military. 
 109. UNHCR & SAVE THE CHILDREN UK, NOTE FOR IMPLEMENTING AND OPERATIONAL 
PARTNERS ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE & EXPLOITATION (2002), available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/6010f9ed3c651c93c1256b6d00560fca; see also 
Michel Alger & Francoise Bouchet-Soulinier, Humanitarian Spaces: Spaces of Exception, in IN THE 
SHADOW, supra note 66, at 297, 302 (describing such abuses in refugee and IDP camps in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone); Fabrice Weissman, Sierra Leone: Peace at Any Price, in IN THE SHADOW, 
supra note 66 (describing sexual exploitation by aid workers in IDP camps in Sierra Leone). 
 110. See Scott A. Levin, Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by U.N. Peacekeepers, 19 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 833, 834-35 (2003). 
 111. See Malinda M. Schmiechen, Parallel Lives, Uneven Justice: An Analysis of Rights, 
Protection and Redress for Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Camps, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 473, 490 (2003). 
 112. For example, rape or other sexual abuse committed by a public official would in many 
cases constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture, but similar actions taken by a non-state 
actor would not, unless undertaken with the “consent or acquiescence” of such an official. Torture 
Convention, supra note 97, art. 1. Rape and related sexual violence are also considered war crimes if 
committed in either international or internal armed conflict, but only those individuals acting under the 
authority of the actual parties to the conflict may be held criminally responsible for such acts. ICC 
Statute, supra note 99, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). Though non-state actors can commit crimes 
against humanity, such activity would only qualify if it is “widespread or systematic” and conducted 
pursuant to an organizational plan or policy. Id. arts. 7(1)(g), 7(2)(a). 
 113. For example, states parties to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions agree to criminalize bribery, but bribery is defined only as payment to public 
officials to secure a pecuniary or other advantage. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter 
OECD Convention]. Payment to a government contractor providing services in order to secure a 
subcontract, for example, or some other advantage, would not clearly fall within the prohibition. 
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by charges of preferential treatment, overbilling, cost overruns, and waste.”114 
Elsewhere, employees of Custer Battles, a company that was awarded two $16 
million contracts by USAID to provide security for the Baghdad airport and 
distribute Iraqi dinars, 115  reportedly chartered a flight to Beirut with $10 
million in new Iraqi dinars in their luggage—which were promptly 
confiscated by Lebanese officials.116 The company also set up sham Cayman 
Islands subsidiaries to submit invoices, and regularly overcharged for 
materials—in one case charging the United States $10 million for materials 
that it purchased for $3.5 million.117 In short, corruption and fraud have been 
rampant in the Iraqi contracts. Yet, legal oversight (and democratic 
accountability) is limited because such contractors operate beyond many of 
the transparency rules that would apply to government entities.118
 Thus, widespread privatization potentially threatens a wide variety of 
public law values.119 One response to this problem, of course, is to interpret 
(or amend) the international law norms themselves either to remove any state 
action requirement, or at any rate to construe such a requirement leniently. 
Indeed, at least some of the conventional state-centered story of international 
law that I have recounted has long been subject to challenge. For example, the 
U.N.’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts aims to make clear that the “conduct of any State organ shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s 
conduct shall be attributed to the state if he or she is acting on the state’s 
                                                                                                                               
 
 114. Warren Hoge, U.N. Criticizes Iraq Occupation Oil Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at 
A21. In addition, the chief contracting officer for the Army Corps of Engineers has publicly accused the 
Army of granting preferential treatment to KBR (through its parent company, Halliburton) in awarding 
contracts in Iraq and Bosnia, in violation of U.S. contracting regulations. Erik Eckholm, A Top U.S. 
Contracting Official for the Army Calls for an Inquiry in the Halliburton Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2004, at A13. 
 115. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4. 
 116. Id. at 1-2 (statement of Alan Grayson). 
 117. Id. at 2 (statement of Alan Grayson). These allegations resulted in a private enforcement 
suit under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000). See Yochai J. Dreazen, Attorney 
Pursues Iraq Contractor Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at B1 (discussing the suit). Indeed, in 
March 2006 a jury ordered Custer Battles to return $10 million in ill-gotten funds to the government. See 
id. Yet, though the district court judge in that case had permitted the suit to proceed, United States ex 
rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), it is unclear whether the 
verdict will ultimately hold up on appeal and whether such False Claims Act suits will be deemed 
sustainable in this context.
 118. See infra text accompanying notes 129-130. As noted in note 117, supra, it is unclear 
whether or not the False Claims Act will ultimately provide an effective avenue for legal accountability. 
 119. To be sure, as I have argued elsewhere, these gaps may not be as significant as they first 
appear. See Dickinson, supra note 20. To begin with, the baseline of accountability for state actors 
performing foreign affairs functions is not that great. Such actors are not held accountable for violating 
the norms that effectuate public law values that often. Thus, the shift to private actors does not represent 
a dramatic decline in accountability—certainly not as great a decline as in the domestic setting, where 
state actors are at least sometimes held accountable for failing to uphold public law values. This 
comparison places the perils of privatization in perspective.  
  In addition, alternative avenues of legal accountability may exist under private law. As in 
the domestic privatization context, immunities applicable to governmental employees arguably do not 
apply, thereby opening up potential private law actions such as tort claims. Thus, in some ways private 
contractors may face a greater risk of legal liability than governmental actors. 
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instructions or under the state’s direction.120 Likewise, courts and tribunals 
have at times applied principles of state responsibility for instrumentalities to 
impute the liability of companies onto states. 121  And some courts have 
suggested that certain international law norms, such as the laws of war, can be 
used to hold non-state actors directly accountable, at least in some 
circumstances. 122  Alternatively, non-state actors can be held liable under 
theories of complicity or aiding and abetting.123 Thus, it would be wrong to 
characterize international law as completely impotent with regard to private 
contractors.124
 Yet, though I am sympathetic to efforts to revise or interpret the norms 
of public international law to apply to private contractors, I argue that such 
efforts should not be the only response to privatization in the international 
realm. Indeed, public international law norms are imperfectly enforced in the 
best of circumstances, and any interpretational ambiguities with regard to 
contractors only compounds the practical difficulties. Thus, those concerned 
that public values may be lost in a privatized world would be well-advised to 
look in other directions as well. And, as we will see, the contractual 
relationship that creates the very structure of privatization may itself offer a 
means of promoting and enforcing public law values, and it is to such avenues 
of accountability that we now turn. 
III. CONTRACT AS A TOOL TO EXTEND AND ENFORCE PUBLIC LAW VALUES 
Contracts between governmental entities and the private organizations 
providing services can themselves serve as vehicles to promote public law 
values. Contractual terms can specify norms and structure the contractual 
relationship in ways that spur contractors to implement those norms. Thus, 
although typically conceived as the quintessential private law form, contracts 
used in this way can be a tool to “publicize” the privatization relationship.125  
                                                                                                                               
 
 120. See supra note 28; see also, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private 
Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801 (2002). 
 121. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding Iran responsible for corporation over which it exercised control); Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228, 241-42 (1987) (holding the same); Maffezini 
v. Kingdom of Spain (Rectification and Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Nov. 13, 2000, Jan. 31, 
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 122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on the Defense Motion on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 61 (Aug. 10, 1995) (noting that war crimes include “crimes committed by any person ... 
whether committed by combatants or civilians, including the nationals of neutral states”); Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of 
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals”).  
 123. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005). 
 124. See generally, e.g., Chia Lehnardt, Private Military Companies and State Responsibility, 
in MARKET FORCES: REGULATING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt 
eds., forthcoming 2007) (describing ways in which international law holds states accountable for acts of 
private military companies). 
 125. See Freeman, supra note 11. 
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Administrative law scholars have recently explored this insight in the 
domestic context. Most notably, Jody Freeman has suggested that states 
“could require compliance with both procedural and substantive standards that 
might otherwise be inapplicable or unenforceable against private 
providers.” 126  Yet this work has focused on privatization of healthcare, 
welfare, and prisons in the United States and has not considered privatization 
of military, foreign aid, and diplomatic activities. Meanwhile, as noted 
previously,127 few if any international law scholars, policymakers, or NGOs 
have considered the possibilities of using contractual terms in the international 
context. Accordingly, this Part seeks to bridge the gap between domestic 
administrative law and international law scholarship by exploring a variety of 
contractual mechanisms that might be used to extend public law values to 
privatized foreign affairs.  
Specifically, I discuss nine contracting practices that could be deployed 
in the foreign affairs arena: (1) incorporating public law standards in 
contractual terms; (2) requiring that private contractors receive training; (3) 
enhancing contractual monitoring, both by internal governmental actors and 
third parties; (4) requiring that contractors receive accreditation from 
independent organizations; (5) laying out clear performance benchmarks; (6) 
mandating contractor self-evaluation; (7) enhancing governmental termination 
provisions and allowing for partial governmental takeover of contracts; (8) 
allowing for beneficiary participation in contract design; and (9) strengthening 
enforcement mechanisms, including greater whistleblower protections and 
more opportunities for third-party beneficiary suits. In considering these 
possibilities, I will use Iraq as a case study, examining all of the publicly 
available contracts the U.S. government has negotiated to support the U.S. 
military or to provide for foreign aid to Iraq. Nevertheless, these same 
principles would apply to other types of contracts negotiated by states or 
international organizations with contractors providing a variety of foreign 
affairs functions. 
The contractual mechanisms I discuss are particularly important in the 
foreign affairs context because many of these contracts are negotiated in 
secret, without competition, on a “no bid basis,” based on exceptions to the 
normal requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).128  For 
example, with respect to the U.S. government’s foreign affairs contracts in 
Iraq, in many cases it is impossible for the public or a watchdog group even to 
obtain the text of the contracts, either because government officials have kept 
them secret for security reasons,129 or because the contractors have exercised 
what is essentially a veto, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), for 
certain types of commercial information.130 Problems posed by secrecy are 
reinforced by problems of conflict of interest because many of the contracts 
                                                                                                                               
 
 126. Freeman, supra note 18, at 634.  
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28. 
 128. See Megan A. Kinsey, Note, Transparency in Government Procurement: An International 
Consensus?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 161-62 (2004). 
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(1) (2000). 
 130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(4) (2000). 
2006] Public Law Values 403 
are awarded to firms run by former government personnel. A 2003 study by 
the Center for Public Integrity reports that sixty percent of the companies that 
received contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan “had employees or board members 
who either served in or had close ties to the executive branch for Republican 
and Democratic administrations, for members of Congress of both parties, or 
at the highest levels of the military.”131 Thus, it is essential that, at the very 
least, the contracts themselves incorporate public values.   
A. Incorporating Public Law Standards in Contractual Terms 
First, of course, the contracts could explicitly require that the contractors 
obey the norms that implement public law values. Specifically, the terms of 
each agreement could provide that private contractors must abide by relevant 
legal rules applicable to governmental actors. Such contractual terms would 
obviate the need to show that the private actors were functioning as an 
extension of government so as to satisfy any state action requirement that 
might arise under domestic and international legal regimes. Instead, the norms 
applicable to governmental actors would simply be part of the contractual 
terms, enforceable like any other provisions, regardless of state action. 
In the domestic setting, such provisions are commonplace. As a term in 
their contracts with privately run prisons, for example, many states require 
compliance with constitutional, federal, state, and private standards for prison 
operation and inmates’ rights. 132  In addition, contractual agreements may 
require contractors to provide for hearings and review of contractor actions.133  
 The U.S. government’s military and foreign aid contracts in Iraq, by 
contrast, are woefully inadequate on this score. To be sure, a 2005 Department 
of Defense (DOD) document providing general instructions regarding 
contracting practices does state that contractors “shall abide by applicable 
laws, regulations, DoD policy, and international agreements….”134 Yet, of the 
sixty publicly available Iraq contracts,135 none contains specific provisions 
requiring contractors to obey human rights, anticorruption, or transparency 
                                                                                                                               
 
 131. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, WINNING CONTRACTORS: U.S. CONTRACTORS REAP 
THE WINDFALLS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION (2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
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 134. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, No. 3020.41, § 6.1 (Oct. 3, 2005). 
 135. See Center for Public Integrity, Contracts and Reports, http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
wow/resources.aspx?act=resources (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Contracts and Reports] 
(providing text of contracts). 
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norms. The agreements between the U.S. government and CACI to supply 
military interrogators starkly illustrate this point. The intelligence personnel 
were hired pursuant to a standing “blanket purchase agreement” between the 
Department of the Interior and CACI, negotiated in 2000.136 Under such an 
agreement the procuring agency need not request specific services at the time 
the agreement is made but rather may enter task orders as the need arises. In 
2003, eleven task orders, worth $66.2 million were entered (none of which 
was the result of competitive bidding).137 The orders specify only that CACI 
would provide interrogation support and analysis work for the U.S. Army in 
Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel, intelligence report writing, and 
screening/interrogation of detainees at established holding areas.” 138  
Significantly, the orders do not expressly require that the private contractor 
interrogators comply with international human rights or humanitarian law 
rules such as those contained in the Torture Convention or the Geneva 
Conventions. Likewise, although the contractors are subject to international 
and domestic laws prohibiting the bribery of government officials,139 as well 
as the general terms of the FAR,140 none of the contracts specifically prohibits 
the contractors themselves from accepting bribes, an area that remains 
ambiguous in domestic and international law. Similarly, the contracts do not 
provide terms specifying the applicability of FOIA, which would help make 
contractor activities more transparent.  
B. Requiring that Private Contractors Receive Training 
Foreign affairs contracts could also explicitly require that contractors 
receive training in activities that would promote public law values. Such 
training, as a contractual requirement, could help instill in contractor 
employees a sense of the importance of these values. At the same time, 
training could provide employees with concrete recommendations about how 
to implement these values in specific, challenging situations. 
Again, in the domestic setting such training provisions are 
commonplace. A standard term in state agreements with companies that 
manage private prisons, for example, requires companies to certify that the 
training they provide to personnel is comparable to that offered to state 
employees.141 Such training would normally include instruction concerning 
legal limits on the use of force and examples of what those limits mean in 
circumstances likely to arise in the prison setting.  
                                                                                                                               
 
 136. See Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and CACI Premier Technology, 
Inc., No. NBCHA010005 (2000) [hereinafter DOI-CACI]. 
 137. Work Orders Nos. 000035D004, 000036D004, 000037D004, 000038D0004, 
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 140. 48 C.F.R. §§ 2.000 (2006).  
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Yet, while the 2005 DOD instructions require documentation of training 
concerning appropriate use of force,142 none of the publicly available Iraq 
contracts appears to require such training. Indeed, although a few of the 
agreements require that contractors hire employees with a certain number of 
years’ experience, 143  none specifies that the contractor must provide any 
particular training at all. For example, the U.S. government’s agreement with 
Chugach McKinley, Inc. to screen and hire a broad range of military support 
personnel—from doctors to “special mission advisers”—says nothing about 
whether such personnel will receive training in applicable international law 
standards, even though such personnel may be in a position to commit 
abuses. 144  The U.S. government’s agreements with CACI to provide 
interrogators are likewise completely silent on whether interrogators will 
receive education in international humanitarian and human rights law, training 
that U.S. military interrogators would normally receive.145 Not surprisingly 
then, an Army Inspector General report on the conditions that led to the Abu 
Ghraib scandal concluded that 35% of CACI’s Iraqi interrogators did not even 
have any “formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques,” 
let alone training in international law norms.146 This omission is particularly 
glaring given the highly volatile Iraqi environment.  
 Anti-corruption training would also be useful for foreign affairs 
contractors generally, and for contracts in Iraq specifically. Iraq ranks among 
the worst countries in the world on Transparency International’s corruption 
index,147 and it is no surprise that such corruption reaches U.S. contractors 
operating there. Indeed, one former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
official, Alan Grayson, has asserted that lack of employee screening and 
training led to the shocking abuses committed by Custer Battles.148 Yet such 
contracts say nothing about training for contractors in practices to avoid 
corruption. And while training requirements undoubtedly would increase the 
cost of the contracts, the fraud and waste that could be deterred with better 
training might well offset such increases. 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
 
 142. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, supra note 134, § 6.3.5.3.4. 
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 148. See supra text accompanying notes 115–118. 
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C. Enhancing Contractual Monitoring, Both by Internal Governmental 
Actors and by Third Parties 
Provisions could also be made for increased contract monitoring, which 
could provide an important check on abuses. Such monitoring should include, 
to begin with, sufficient numbers of trained and experienced governmental 
contract monitors. At the same time, governmental ombudspersons—leaders 
of independent offices charged with providing enhanced oversight—serve as 
an important supplement to the contract monitors. Thus, at a minimum, it is 
essential that government agencies devote enough resources to ensure that 
these requirements are implemented in a meaningful way. In addition, outside 
independent non-governmental organizations, both for-profit and non-profit, 
can serve an important function by monitoring contracts.  
Contracts for services in the domestic context regularly include this 
three-tiered monitoring structure: government personnel assigned as contract 
monitors, supplemented by agency actors such as ombudspersons, further 
supplemented by independent outside groups. In the privatized health care 
context, for example, where private nursing homes receive Medicaid funding 
and private hospitals receive Medicare and Medicaid support, the trend is 
toward agreements that require a state-appointed contract manager.149 Federal 
agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services (whose 
Inspector General issues reports on contracts with private hospitals that 
receive public funding 150 ) and the Health Care Financing Administration 
(which exerts fairly tight control over private nursing homes receiving 
Medicaid funding151) also have significant oversight authority. In addition, 
third-party independent organizations play an important role. For example, the 
Joint Commission on Health Care and Accreditation of Health Organizations 
(JCAHO), a private organization of professional associations, certifies health 
care institutions for compliance with federal regulations and state licensure 
laws.152
 Foreign affairs contracts currently provide for far less monitoring. To be 
sure, the statutory and regulatory scheme includes provisions for 
governmental contract monitors, supplemented by inspectors general of the 
respective agencies responsible for the contracts,153 as well as for auditing of 
                                                                                                                               
 
 149. Freeman, supra note 18, at 608-09.  
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contracts by independent private accounting firms.154 Yet, the work of these 
monitors focuses primarily on whether the contractors are keeping adequate 
accounts and refraining from fraud and bribery. Contracts say little about 
human rights norms, and governmental contract monitors and ombudspersons 
are not ordinarily focused on these values when scrutinizing contractors.155 To 
the extent that independent third-party groups are empowered to monitor 
under the contract, they tend to be auditing firms, whose expertise lies in 
financial matters, not in international human rights or humanitarian law. 
Foreign affairs contracts rarely, if ever, provide for monitoring by independent 
groups with expertise in this area.156  
 Moreover, in practice, foreign affairs contracts tend to escape even this 
limited oversight. This is because many of the monitoring requirements tend 
not to apply in emergency situations, which are, of course, precisely the 
occasions when military intervention or humanitarian relief efforts and post-
reconstruction aid are most likely. Thus, ordinary contracting procedures, such 
as competitive bidding, are often waived.157 In addition, many of the contracts 
are written as cost reimbursement contracts, often termed “cost-plus” 
agreements, under which the government reimburses the contractor for costs 
incurred in providing a service, plus a fee that is calculated as a percentage of 
the cost.158 Though often criticized as leading to waste and abuse,159 such 
contracts become the norm in emergency situations, rather than the exception. 
At the same time, too few contract monitors are appointed, those who are 
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Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 98, arts. 76, 143. 
Yet, it is at best ambiguous whether the ICRC would be empowered to play a similar role with respect to 
private security contractors. The contracts could make this role explicit. 
 157. In practice, one way these requirements are avoided is through the use of blanket purchase 
order agreements, in which task orders can be issued under pre-existing contracts. See WINNING 
CONTRACTORS, supra note 131, and accompanying text. For criticism of the lack of open bidding on the 
Iraq contracts, see CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, REBUILDING IRAQ—THE CONTRACTORS, 
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/rebuilding_iraq/index.asp. For an opposing view, see 
Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, USAID’s Procurement Contracts: Insider’s View, 39 PROCUREMENT LAW 
10 (2003). 
 158. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.301-16.307 (2006). 
 159. Under the cost-plus system, companies have an incentive to inflate the costs of services so 
that their fee, typically measured as a percentage of this cost, is as high as possible, see Laura Peterson, 
Outsourcing Government: Service Contracting Has Risen Dramatically in the Last Decade, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=68 
[hereinafter Outsourcing Government], although such contracts do contain a cost ceiling that cannot be 
exceeded without the contracting officer’s approval. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1 (2005). Under the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), these contracts can only be utilized when costs cannot be estimated with 
sufficient accuracy. Id. § 16.301-2.  
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appointed lack expertise, and ombudspersons are not given the resources they 
need to do an effective job.  
 The monitoring of the Iraq contracts, or virtual lack thereof, provides a 
salient example. The government agencies with responsibility for the 
contracts—primarily USAID, the DOD, and the now dismantled Coalition 
Provisional Authority—devoted extraordinarily minimal resources to 
monitoring.160 For example, USAID has responsibility for approximately $3 
billion in reconstruction projects,161 but the agency had only four contract 
monitoring personnel on the ground as of March 2003.162 In fact, due to the 
difficulties of monitoring contracts with so little staff, USAID determined to 
contract out the monitoring function itself! 163  Likewise, a recent DOD 
Inspector General study concluded that more than half of the Iraq contracts 
had not been adequately monitored.164 This fact is not surprising given that 
DOD’s acquisition workforce was reduced by more than half between 1990 
and 2001, while the department’s contracting workload increased by more 
than twelve percent. 165  In addition, those who were assigned to monitor 
contract performance were often inadequately trained.166 Finally, in an ironic 
twist, private contractors themselves are often hired to write the procedural 
rules governing contracting rules and monitoring protocols, thus leading to 
further conflict-of-interest problems. Indeed, the DOD handbook on the 
contracting process was drafted by one of its principal military contractors.167  
The CPA was plagued with similar problems. A recent report notes that 
the CPA hadn’t kept accounts for the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash 
in its vault, had awarded contracts worth billions of dollars to American firms 
without tender, and had no idea what was happening to the money from the 
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) which was being spent by the interim Iraqi 
government ministries.168  
One former CPA official has observed that, as a result of poor oversight, 
“contracts were made that were mistakes, and were poorly, if at all, supervised 
[and] money was spent that could have been saved, if we simply had the right 
numbers of people.”169 For example, even devoting a single staff person to the 
                                                                                                                               
 
 160. For a searing indictment of the government’s failure to oversee military contractors and 
that failure’s role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, see Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu 
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WASHINGTON, REP. NO. D-2004-057, at 24 (2004). 
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NO. GAO-03-771R, at 1 (2003); see also Outsourcing Government, supra note 159. For a detailed 
discussion of the depletion of the acquisition workforce, see David A. Whiteford, Negotiated 
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 167. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 123-24. 
 168. Ed Harriman, Where Has All the Money Gone?, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, July 7, 2005, at 
4, 5. 
 169. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4. 
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two $16 million Custer Battles contracts that gave rise to multiple instances of 
fraud and abuse170 would have saved at least $4 million.171  
Finally, the dispersal of authority to issue foreign affairs contracts across 
multiple agencies creates interagency communication problems and conflicts 
of interest that impede oversight. 172  For example, officials at different 
agencies use different methods to calculate the costs of contracts, and these 
methods may also vary from those used by the companies themselves.173 In 
addition, because agencies can earn fees for facilitating other agencies’ 
contracts but are not adequately held to account for monitoring those 
contracts, agencies have incentives to sponsor other agencies’ contracts but 
little incentive to supervise them.174 These arrangements can lead to abuse, as 
occurred in the case of the Department of the Interior sponsorship of DOD’s 
task orders for intelligence services at Abu Ghraib prison under an existing 
contract between CACI and the Interior Department.175
In short, the foreign affairs contracts could provide far better protections 
for public law values through greater monitoring. Although the statutory and 
regulatory regime contemplates a combination of supervision by contract 
monitors, independent agency oversight through inspectors general, and 
limited financial auditing by third-party entities, these provisions have not 
worked well in practice due to insufficient staffing and resources, combined 
with the large number of contracts. To be sure, statutory and regulatory 
reforms could address these problems. But, alternatively, the contracts 
themselves could remedy these deficiencies to some extent, by specifying 
greater numbers of monitors and requiring that they possess a certain degree 
of training, as well as by allowing for independent oversight by third-party 
groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  
D. Laying Out Clear Performance Benchmarks 
Of course, to some degree increased contract monitoring can only be 
effective to the extent that the contracts have clear benchmarks against which 
to measure compliance. In the domestic context, commentators and 
policymakers have long urged that contracts include benchmarks, and rigorous 
performance standards regularly appear in contracts.176 Scholars have argued 
that, ideally, performance-based contracts should “clearly spell out the desired 
                                                                                                                               
 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 115-117 
 171. See generally SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 24 (statement of Franklin Willis). Of 
course, the lack of oversight may have a more cynical explanation: it permits private contractors (who 
may have powerful connections within government) to reap profits without significant constraints. 
 172. The DOD has taken more and more control over reconstruction and emergency relief 
functions, normally the province of USAID. See Contracts and Reports, supra note 135. The State 
Department, meanwhile, manages the contract with DynCorp to provide Iraqi police training. Id. And 
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assistance funds.  
 173. WINNING CONTRACTORS, supra note 131. 
 174. Schooner, supra note 160, at 564-70 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., HARRY P. HATRY, URBAN INST., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: GETTING 
RESULTS 3-10 (1999). 
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end result” but leave the choice of method to the contractor, who should have 
“as much freedom as possible in figuring out how to best meet government’s 
performance objective.”177  
These ideas have been implemented most notably in contracts with 
private prisons. For example, under the model contract for private prison 
management drafted by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, contractors 
must meet such delineated standards for security, meals, and education.178 
They must also certify that the training provided to personnel is comparable to 
that offered to state employees.179 In Texas, contractors must abide by similar 
terms and, in addition, must “establish performance measures for 
rehabilitative programs.” 180  In addition, the American Correctional 
Association is revising its accreditation standards to include performance 
measures, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is 
developing performance-based standards for juvenile correctional facilities.181 
Commentators have noted, further, that performance measures for private 
prison operators could include both  
process measures such as the number of educational or vocational programs, or outcome 
measures such as the Logan quality of confinement index, the number of assaults, or the 
recidivism rate. . . . Because no single statistic adequately captures ‘quality,’ and because 
focusing on any single measure could have perverse effects, performance-based contracts 
should tie compensation to a large and rich set of variables.182
Privatized welfare programs have also experimented with performance 
measures as a means to improve quality. In 1996, Congress authorized the 
implementation of welfare programs “through contracts with charitable, 
religious, or private organizations.”183 Since then, states have increasingly 
contracted with such organizations,184 and many of these contracts contain 
performance benchmarks and output requirements. 185 For example, under a 
performance-based system, a welfare contractor might receive financial 
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rewards for increasing the percentage of program participants who receive job 
placements.186
The foreign affairs contracts are notably less rigorous in providing for 
performance measures. Although military service contracts are difficult to 
evaluate because so many of them are not publicly available, contract officers 
familiar with the contracts have remarked on their generally vague terms.187 
And the fact that they are often indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) 
contracts adds to their open-ended quality. 188  Under this structure, the 
government awards a contract that does not specify how many services or 
goods will be necessary or the dates upon which they will be required.189 
These additional details are specified in subsequent task orders, which 
themselves are often vague because the task orders need not pass though the 
same degree of supervision as the initial contract award.190 Of course, such 
contracts may sometimes be necessary, because the government cannot know 
in advance precisely what will be required or for how long.191 Yet the lack of 
any administrable standards in these contracts can lead to significant 
abuses.192
 Of the publicly available Iraq contracts for military services, it is striking 
that none contains clear benchmarks or output requirements. Instead, they are 
phrased in amorphous language that provides little opportunity for compliance 
evaluation. For example, a contract between the U.S. government and MPRI 
to provide translators for government personnel, including interrogators, 
simply provides that the contractors will supply interpreters.193 The agreement 
says nothing about whether the interpreters must be effective or how 
effectiveness might be measured. 194  Similarly, the CACI task orders for 
interrogators specify only that CACI will provide interrogation support and 
analysis work for the U.S. Army in Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel, 
intelligence report writing, and screening/interrogation of detainees at 
established holding areas.”195 Other than these broad goals, the task orders say 
little more. To be sure, security concerns may require some degree of 
vagueness. Nonetheless, the task orders could be much more specific about 
training requirements, standards of conduct, supervision, and performance 
parameters. 
 Turning to the foreign aid context, agencies tend to promote the use of 
results-based agreements, under which contractors must demonstrate specific, 
                                                                                                                               
 
 186. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1387-88. 
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tangible results that are to be evaluated by the agency.196 Yet in practice many 
such agreements do not actually contain any results-based requirements, often 
because the aid, particularly in emergency relief settings, is provided on an 
expedited basis to organizations with very small staffs. With regard to Iraq, 
for example, a review of the publicly available USAID agreements reveals 
that only a few set forth specific performance benchmarks or requirements.197
 To be sure, performance benchmarks that are too strict can pose 
problems. As scholars of domestic privatization have noted, discretion can 
serve useful goals; indeed, discretion is in part what makes privatization 
desirable, as private contractors have more flexibility than rulebound 
bureaucratic actors to pursue innovative approaches.198 Output requirements 
that preserve flexibility about the means to achieve those results are therefore 
the most effective.199 But even carefully tailored output requirements can go 
awry, as when, for example, private welfare providers “cream” those accepted 
into their programs in order to increase the percentage of those who receive 
job placements. 200  Moreover, output requirements can sometimes give 
contractors tunnel vision, leading them to focus only on the benchmarks, 
thereby missing opportunities to achieve wider benefits. A recent study of the 
enhanced “auditing” that accompanied privatization in Thatcherite Britain, for 
example, suggests that narrow output requirements steered organizations and 
individuals away from broader, more diffuse, social goals.201  
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 In addition, by their very nature, results-based contracts raise difficult 
questions about how best to measure output. Creating benchmarks may be 
relatively straight-forward if the project at issue involves simply building a 
bridge or dam, but it is very difficult to measure intangibles, such as fostering 
human development or building civil society.202 Likewise, short-term results, 
such as whether food aid was delivered, are much easier to measure than 
longer-term systemic efforts to alleviate poverty, provide education, and so 
on. As a consequence, results-based contracts tend to put more emphasis on 
short-term delivery of services rather than longer-term impact.203  Finally, 
contractual output requirements do not, of course, necessarily ensure 
compliance because contractors may simply fail to meet their goals. In 
addition, even the most detailed performance requirements and standards 
inevitably leave considerable discretion to the contractor.204  
 Nonetheless, despite problems with overly rigid performance 
benchmarks, the foreign affairs contracts (at least those that are publicly 
available) appear to fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Indeed, they 
possess so few benchmarks and output requirements that they contain no 
meaningful evaluative criteria whatsoever. In such circumstances, enhanced 
performance benchmarks could be a useful contractual tool.  
E.  Requiring that Contractors Receive Accreditation from Independent 
Organizations 
Another contract-based tool for promoting public law values is 
accreditation. Independent organizations, often consisting of experts or 
professionals in the field, can evaluate and rate private contractors. These 
ratings can then be used in the contracting process because agreements can 
require that contractors receive certain rankings. Or, governmental entities or 
international institutions, such as the United Nations, could develop 
accreditation regimes. 
Again, the domestic context offers a particularly rich set of examples 
that could provide useful lessons in the foreign affairs setting. For example, in 
the field of publicly funded, privately provided health care, JCAHO accredits 
hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding. Indeed, such 
accreditation is required by statute as well as by contract.205 State laws or 
contractual terms also often specify that health maintenance organizations 
must receive accreditation by the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA), an independent non-profit organization, before receiving public 
funding. 206  Until recently, NCQA certification was primarily voluntary, 
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offering health maintenance organizations an advantage when competing for 
lucrative health care delivery contracts. When states became managed care 
purchasers, however, they adopted NCQA as a benchmark of quality.207  
Similarly, many contracts with private prison operators require 
companies to receive accreditation by the American Correctional Association 
(ACA).208 An organization of correctional professionals that has existed for 
over a century, the ACA accredits prisons and provides training for prison 
personnel while also setting standards that apply to virtually every aspect of 
prison operation. 209  Not only has ACA accreditation become a standard 
contract requirement, 210  but federal courts have used ACA standards to 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.211 Even private investors look 
to accreditation as an indication of quality. 212  Thus, the accreditation 
requirement creates significant compliance incentives. 
Privatized education regimes such as charter schools have also 
considered accreditation by independent organizations as a means of ensuring 
quality.213  The focus of many independent organizations on facilities and 
administrative processes over underlying educational quality has led some 
critics to charge that educational accreditation is relatively ineffective. 214  
Nonetheless, commentators have advocated improved accreditation 
procedures and greater use of such accreditation to promote public law 
values.215
Indeed, domestic administrative law scholars have noted that these 
independent, private accrediting entities are effectively setting the standards 
that give meaning to public law values.216 In that regard, the relative insularity 
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of the standard-setting and accreditation process may undermine the ability of 
broader groups, including consumers and the public at large, to participate in 
the process.217 There is also the concern that private accreditors in some cases 
might be too close to the contractors, and therefore too lenient. 218  
Nevertheless, even critics agree that the standards are often much better than 
those that would be developed by agency bureaucrats, and despite the 
imperfections, accreditation has served as an important check on the 
contracting process.219  
In contrast, accreditation is glaringly absent in the foreign affairs 
context.220 Human rights organizations, governments, and the United Nations 
have begun to encourage corporations, particularly those in the extraction 
industries, to comply with voluntary labor, environmental, and human rights 
standards.221 A consortium of NGOs that deliver humanitarian relief have 
initiated the SPHERE project, which is an effort to set standards for the 
provision of humanitarian aid, including specific guidelines for field 
operations, training, and self evaluation. 222  And an industry-founded 
association of private security companies, the International Peace Officers 
Association (IPOA), has begun to construct a comprehensive code of conduct 
that includes human rights standards.223 Nevertheless, neither the U.N., nor 
domestic governments, nor outside groups concerned with potential abuses by 
foreign affairs contractors have so far undertaken serious efforts either to 
harness these nascent accreditation initiatives or to promote other 
accreditation projects. 
This failure is particularly striking in the Iraq context. Not one of the 
available contracts for aid or military services requires that the entities 
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receiving the contracts be vetted or accredited by independent organizations. 
For example, unlike domestic prison contracts, which routinely require 
accreditation by ACA and compliance with a comprehensive set of standards, 
the contracts with CACI to provide interrogators at Abu Ghraib contain only 
the most basic guidelines and make no mention of human rights compliance or 
accreditation requirements.224 The contract between the U.S. government and 
Dyncorp to provide law enforcement advisers to train Iraqi police similarly 
contains no provision mandating that Dyncorp be accredited,225 even though 
Dyncorp employees were implicated in sex abuse when performing under a 
similar contract in Bosnia.226 Likewise, although contracts could require that 
humanitarian aid organizations agree to the SPHERE guidelines in order to 
receive contracts, no such requirement has been imposed.227
Yet, such accreditation would seem to be particularly important in the 
foreign affairs area, where, as discussed previously, security concerns and 
special considerations often eliminate competition in the contracting process, 
resulting in contracts that are structured without the usual market controls. 
Significantly, the problem is not only that international organizations and 
domestic governments neglect to require accreditation in their contracts, but 
also that NGOs and other independent groups have not sought a robust 
accreditation role. After all, more NGOs could, like the SPHERE Project’s 
efforts in humanitarian aid, begin to rate military contractors independently, 
regardless of whether the government contracts require such accreditation. 
These ratings might then become an industry standard that the government 
could be persuaded to use as a contracting factor. This is what occurred with 
NCQA in the domestic health care context. And, even if agency officials 
negotiating contracts choose not to impose accreditation requirements, the 
ratings could serve as a point of pressure in Congress and the public at large. 
Thus, NGOs should spend at least as much energy developing accreditation 
regimes as they do pursuing transnational litigation under various formal 
international law instruments. International organizations could also seek to 
create accreditation regimes. Such accreditation would likely be influential 
over time, even if states at first formally refuse to implement accreditation 
requirements into their contracts. 
F. Mandating Contractor Self-Evaluation 
Contractors could also be required to perform self-evaluations as a way 
of enhancing accountability. Presented with an internal self-evaluation, an 
outside monitor, whether governmental or third-party, can often scrutinize the 
                                                                                                                               
 
 224. See Work Orders, supra note 137.  
 225. See Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of State and Dyncorp, Iraq Law Enforcement, No. 
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as well to follow SPHERE guidelines in fulfilling contracts. 
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contractor’s performance more quickly and efficiently. Of course, self-
evaluation gives the contractor discretion to massage the data and indeed can 
be subject to outright manipulation and abuse.228 But nonetheless, it can be a 
useful starting point for outside monitors, who can at least at the outset make a 
faster assessment as to whether the contractor has met the contract goals. In 
addition, self-evaluation can encourage more effective internal policing by the 
contractor.  
Due to these potential benefits, self-evaluation has emerged as a frequent 
tool in the domestic context. In the world of private prisons, for example, 
contractors regularly are subjected to self-evaluation requirements. In Texas, 
prison contractors must “establish performance measures for rehabilitative 
programs and develop a system to assess achievement and outcomes.”229  
Likewise in the field of health care, a health maintenance organization must, if 
it is to receive accreditation, conduct continuous “quality improvement,” in an 
ongoing internal self-evaluation process. 230  Contracts that require 
accreditation thus effectively mandate such self-evaluation.  
In the foreign affairs context, private foreign aid providers operating 
under agreement with USAID are regularly required to perform self-
evaluation, but foreign aid contracts provided through other agencies and 
military contracts seem to be devoid of such provisions. Again, taking the 
publicly available Iraq contracts as an example, none requires the private 
contractor to file self-evaluation reports, develop internal assessment 
practices, or otherwise engage in self-evaluation.231 And while self-evaluation 
on its own is unlikely to significantly improve contract compliance, such self-
evaluation can be useful in combination with some or all of the other 
contractual provisions discussed in this Article. 
G.  Enhancing Governmental Termination Provisions and Allowing for 
Partial Governmental Takeover of Contracts 
 Contracts could also include terms allowing the relevant government (or 
international organization) to take over the contract by degrees before 
ultimately terminating the agreement for failure to observe provisions 
implementing public law values. Currently, most contracts have implied or 
explicit provisions allowing only for outright termination for noncompliance. 
On its face this sort of termination provision seems as if it would provide a 
strong incentive for contractor compliance. In actual practice, however, 
outright termination is such an extreme measure that governments are often 
reluctant to invoke it, and because contractors know that termination is so 
unlikely, the provisions have almost no disciplining effect.  
                                                                                                                               
 
 228. See id. 
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 Thus, it would be better if such termination provisions were 
supplemented with more graduated penalties, such as provisions permitting 
the partial governmental takeover of contracts. Because graduated penalties 
are less extreme than outright termination, they are far more likely actually to 
be invoked by contract monitors, making them a more effective enforcement 
mechanism than the harsher (though rarely invoked) termination provisions. 
Moreover, if partial takeover fails to stem the abuses, outright termination still 
remains a penalty of last resort. In the domestic context, states are increasingly 
turning to mechanisms such as graduated penalties, for example, to increase 
oversight of private nursing homes receiving public funding.232 Scholars and 
practitioners have also called for the use of such penalties in the private prison 
setting.233
Turning to foreign affairs, while contracts subject to the FAR do contain 
termination provisions, they are rarely exercised and are not supplemented by 
lesser, graduated penalties. As a result, the government has little leverage over 
contractors. The Iraq contracts provide a notable demonstration of this 
problem. When CACI employees were implicated in abuses at Abu Ghraib 
prison, for example, the U.S. government did not terminate its contract. 
Indeed, although the particular employees implicated in the abuse charges no 
longer work at CACI,234 it is unclear whether government actors even so 
much as stepped up their supervision of the contracts. To the contrary, CACI 
actually received a contract extension for interrogation services.235  
Obviously, governments (and international organizations) should be 
encouraged to invoke termination provisions when contractors fall short. But 
even without full termination of the contractors, graduated government (or 
international organization) takeover could provide an added incentive for 
contractors to promote public law values. 
H.  Allowing for Beneficiary Participation or Broader Public Involvement in 
Contract Design 
 Contracts could also permit beneficiaries or the broader public to help 
shape contract terms and evaluate performance. In the domestic context, 
commentators have suggested that such beneficiary participation or 
involvement by the broader public could greatly enhance the extent to which 
contractors fulfill public law values.236 Indeed, as Fred Aman has argued, 
precisely because privatization contracts are difficult to terminate and 
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sometimes become “immutable,” it is “important that the participation of the 
public and the public’s representatives be maximized as early in the process as 
possible.”237 He thus advocates allowing the broader public to play a role in 
the design of the contracts themselves.238  
Some state and local governments have begun to do so. For example, 
Wisconsin’s contracts with managed care organizations to provide health care 
to Medicare and Medicaid recipients include provisions for participation by 
community groups.239 Other states have gone even further and now require 
broad public involvement in virtually all privatization decisions. In Montana, 
for example, any privatization decision must be made subject to a plan 
available to the public and open to public comment.240 Other states have 
similar provisions.241  
Foreign affairs contracts might benefit from this approach. Indeed, such 
participation may be particularly important to promote public law values 
because the ordinary democratic process open to those experiencing the 
effects of privatization in the domestic context is essentially unavailable for 
non-citizens outside the United States who are affected by the activities of 
contractors. To be sure, even in the domestic context, there has long been a 
worry that privatization removes a crucial democratic check on government. 
The link between those affected by government action and the government 
actors is attenuated when that activity is farmed out first from legislatures to 
agencies, and then from agencies to private contractors. Scholars and policy-
makers worry that this form of delegation reduces transparency, which in turn 
reduces the ability of those affected to vote their preferences when things are 
not going well. 242  But when governments turn to private contractors to 
perform foreign affairs functions, the problem is increased exponentially 
because many of the people affected by the contracts in question do not 
belong to the U.S. democratic polity or indeed any democratic polity at all. 
Moreover, U.S. citizens may be less inclined to use the democratic process to 
voice their views when the effects of contracting are felt mainly overseas.  
While it may make less sense to allow involvement of those non-citizens 
affected by military contractors overseas, due to obvious security concerns, 
beneficiary involvement or broader public participation in the design and 
evaluation of foreign aid contracts might be particularly useful. Governments 
providing long-term development aid through private organizations have to 
some degree already begun to adopt this approach. In the United States, 
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USAID has allowed local beneficiaries and NGOs to help design development 
aid agreements, usually on an informal basis, and most frequently when such 
agreements are negotiated through field offices. 243  Agencies other than 
USAID, however, are less likely to engage in such consultation. 244  
Humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction assistance are also less 
likely to incorporate such an approach, though recently the UNHCR has 
begun to explore the possibility of refugee and internally displaced person 
evaluation of humanitarian aid.245  
I must leave to a future article a more detailed discussion of how best to 
maximize opportunities for those affected by a foreign aid project to 
participate in the design of that project.246 Certainly, the idea raises a whole 
host of practical problems. For example, it will be difficult to determine who 
exactly can speak for an affected population. Is NGO participation sufficient? 
How does one determine which civil society actors are most representative? 
What if different sectors of the population disagree as to the efficacy of a 
proposed project? Even assuming one determines the appropriate voices, what 
form should the feedback take? Is informal consultation enough? Or should 
there be a more formal notice and comment period? Or is it necessary to 
establish an independent tribunal with the power to quash the project 
altogether? And should such a tribunal be governmental or private? While 
these questions certainly must be addressed, it seems to me that if we are 
asking them, we will have already advanced the debate quite a bit. The 
important point for now is that we must at the very least begin to explore ways 
of involving in the contracting process itself those affected by foreign affairs 
agreements. Explicit contractual requirements would go a long way toward 
facilitating consultation with beneficiary populations, thereby effectuating 
through contract a broader form of public participation.  
I. Strengthening Enforcement Mechanisms 
Finally, the contracts could provide for enhanced enforcement 
mechanisms. They could, for example, give beneficiaries the opportunity for 
privatized administrative hearings. Additionally, contracts might include 
third-party beneficiary suit provisions, empowering contract beneficiaries or 
other interested parties to sue in domestic courts for breach of contract. And 
whistleblower protections might be enhanced. All of these measures would 
likely increase compliance with contractual terms.  
 In the domestic context, governments and policymakers have begun to 
implement such measures, though private grievance procedures remain more 
prevalent than broader third-party beneficiary suit provisions and 
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whistleblower protections. Commentators regularly call for an expansion of 
third-party beneficiary suit provisions247 (which courts generally refuse to 
imply unless clearly specified in the contract),248 but such provisions remain 
rare. Many private contractors providing aid, however, do offer individual 
complaint mechanisms for affected beneficiaries. 249  Although these aid 
providers are not state actors and would therefore generally be immune from 
constitutional review, such contractual provisions do allow for notice and 
opportunity to be heard, thereby incorporating elements of constitutional due 
process. These private grievance systems are perhaps most evident in 
contracts with private prison operators, which typically require such 
mechanisms.250 But they appear in other contexts as well, such as health care. 
For example, the Medicare statute requires that health maintenance 
organizations receiving federal funding to cover their treatment of Medicare 
beneficiaries must “provide meaningful procedures for hearing and resolving 
grievances between the organization . . . and members enrolled.”251  
 Governments might experiment with similar measures in the foreign 
affairs arena.252 The World Bank has taken steps in this direction, by enabling 
aid beneficiaries to bring grievances before special tribunals challenging gross 
abuses.253 Third-party beneficiary suit provisions, however, are virtually non-
existent, and none of the Iraq contracts contains such a provision. 
Whistleblower protections should also be enhanced. Government officials 
currently receive whistleblower protection for reporting abuses in the 
negotiation or management of contracts, but employees of private companies 
are not protected under the general Whistleblower Protection Act. 254  In 
specific statutes, however, Congress has at times extended whistleblower 
protection to private employees. For example, seven of the major federal 
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environmental statutes contain such whistleblower clauses. 255  Thus, 
whistleblower protection could also be extended to private sector employees 
working for a government contractor, who provide information concerning the 
unlawful performance of a contract. Such a provision, combined with the 
availability of third-party beneficiary suits, or possibly even qui tam 
actions,256 would go a long way towards making sure that any contract-based 
efforts to provide accountability will have back-end enforcement to encourage 
compliance.  
 As discussed previously, enforcing international law norms through 
contract, rather than directly in an international forum, obviates any need to 
argue that the contractor should be deemed a state actor. In addition, because 
international law enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak compared to 
their domestic counterparts, a contractual approach is far more likely to lead 
to meaningful judicial review. In addition, requiring domestic judges to 
enforce international public law values embodied in contracts may have 
important norm internalization effects because such judges would essentially 
be enforcing international law norms. 257  This increased familiarity with 
international law principles might lead to less resistance to those norms as a 
general matter, thereby effectively expanding the reach of international law. 
 On the other hand, one might argue that localizing the enforcement of 
international law norms might either cause international enforcement 
mechanisms to atrophy from disuse or lead to heterogeneity in different 
countries’ understandings of the principles, which could undermine the notion 
of a common international law. Neither objection, however, should create 
serious hesitation about pursuing contractual accountability. First, as 
previously discussed, international law enforcement mechanisms are already 
weak, and to the extent that they have been effective, at least in the human 
rights context, it has been by selectively limiting the scope of enforcement to 
the very most egregious human rights violators. Thus, it is not at all clear that 
providing a possibly effective domestic avenue for pursuing claims against 
private actors (who would have been unlikely to face prosecution 
internationally in any event) will in any meaningful way undermine 
international law institutions. Second, to the extent that domestic judicial 
systems, government officials, and broader populations internalize 
international law norms, it strikes me that the benefits of such norm 
internalization far outweigh any possible concern about maintaining the 
“purity” of the international norm. Local variation is to be expected, of course, 
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but such hetereogeneity in the domestic incorporation of international norms 
strikes me as a strength, not a weakness. Finally, the key point is that without 
focusing on contracts, there may be no realistic way to impose norms of 
accountability on privatized foreign affairs activity at all. Accordingly, those 
seeking to expand the applicability of international law norms should at the 
very least seriously consider using contractual enforcement mechanisms or 
risk the possibility that such norms will simply be ignored in an increasingly 
privatized world. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Resisting privatization in the foreign affairs context is probably no 
longer an option. Indeed, if anything the scope and pace of privatization in the 
international arena is increasing. Moreover, it will not be sufficient merely to 
tweak existing international law treaties or doctrines (or even invent new 
ones) in order to bring private contractors within the ambit of formal 
international law. After all, even if international or domestic courts could be 
convinced that private contractors should be held liable for violation of 
international law norms (which is far from certain), international and 
transnational public law litigation will never be able to hold accountable more 
than a handful of people. Accordingly, those who seek to preserve or expand 
the values embodied in public international law will also need to look 
elsewhere to find mechanisms for ensuring accountability in a privatized 
world. 
In this Article, I have suggested one such mechanism: the government 
contract that creates the privatized relationship in the first place. Drawing on 
the far more extensive domestic administrative law literature on the subject, I 
have identified a variety of provisions that could be incorporated into such 
contracts. These provisions seek to encourage compliance with (and 
enforcement of) human rights and humanitarian law, ensure transparency and 
democratic accountability, and promote norms against corruption, waste, and 
fraud. Taken together, they provide a menu of options for regulators, activists, 
policymakers, and scholars who are concerned at the potential for abuse in our 
current contracting processes.  
Of course, governments may be hesitant to insist on some of these 
contractual provisions. For example, officials may fear that such requirements 
could unduly increase the costs of privatization both to the contractor and to 
the government entity overseeing the contract. 258  Or, more cynically, 
resistance might stem from the fact that governments actually benefit from a 
more opaque process with less public oversight. In any event, one seeming 
difficulty with relying on contractual provisions is that the increased oversight 
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will be included in contracts only as a “matter of legislative or executive 
grace,” and therefore can be rescinded or limited at any time.259
Yet, such objections do not render a contractual approach unrealistic. To 
begin with, concerns about the cost of additional contractual requirements 
may well be over-stated. As the Custer Battles fiasco makes clear, in many 
cases better oversight could actually save the government far more money 
than it costs. And as to concerns that added contractual provisions will cause 
contractors to walk away or prohibitively raise their rates, the short answer is 
that far more empirical work must be done to assess whether such dire 
predictions are accurate. After all, it seems quite unlikely that contractors 
bidding for these extraordinarily lucrative contracts with governments such as 
the United States will pull out of the process just because of some added 
contract requirements. To the contrary, the government should, by all rights, 
have tremendous leverage in the contracting process because there are 
unlikely to be competing customers similarly able to offer billions of dollars 
in contract awards. Indeed, while government contractors in the past have 
often raised concerns about increased compliance costs to object to enhanced 
contractual oversight,260 at least one commentator has challenged such claims, 
noting the absence of compelling evidence that increased oversight through, 
for example, qui tam suits has resulted in a significant number of firms 
refusing to do business with the government.261  
In addition, while some governmental officials surely would prefer a 
more opaque process, governments are not monolithic entities, and proposals 
such as the ones outlined in this Article may be taken up and championed by 
members of the bureaucracy, even without the imprimatur of higher level 
executive branch officials or the legislature. Moreover, it is incorrect to think 
that more robust contractual monitoring can only come about through official 
executive branch or legislative action. First of all, some of the proposals for 
monitoring of contracts and accreditation or rating of contractors could be 
undertaken by NGOs or other groups without any official action whatsoever. 
While such evaluations might not initially have the power of the state behind 
them, the example of NCQA indicates that, over time, governments can be 
convinced to adopt a previously unofficial rating system as its own. Second, 
even if governments never adopted the standards, simply the process of 
evaluating and accrediting contractors would provide a rich source of public 
information about privatization that could be used to bring popular political 
(or economic) pressure to bear on noncompliant contractors. Such public 
reporting might also allow citizen watchdog groups (or even competing 
contractors) to monitor the effectiveness of particular contracts, publicize 
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deficiencies, and lobby government officials for change.262 Third, advocacy at 
the international level could result in treaties or other international regimes 
that actually require governments to include oversight provisions in certain 
categories of contracts, thus creating increasing pressure for change. In any 
event, as the domestic examples demonstrate, governments and agencies can, 
at least at times, be mobilized to require meaningful contractual oversight.  
In the end, whatever the drawbacks of a contractual approach, they are 
certainly no greater than the weaknesses of the existing formal 
transnational/international court system. Indeed, the use of contractual 
provisions has the benefit of opening up the possibility of legal enforcement 
regardless of whether or not there is state action and to provide the foundation 
for legal action in domestic, as well as international, fora. Such contractual 
mechanisms might also pave the way for statutes and treaties. Thus, 
international law scholars, activists, and advocates should spend at least as 
much time studying and lobbying for contract-based compliance regimes as 
they do seeking further openings for international or transnational litigation. 
Perhaps most importantly, we must remember that the proper 
management of privatization will almost certainly require a variety of 
approaches, and we need not choose one to the exclusion of others. My aim 
here is simply to focus attention on privatization in the international realm as a 
crucial field of study, to call for dialogue among international and domestic 
scholars, advocates, and policy-makers concerning appropriate responses, and 
to suggest that more attention be paid to the possibility of using contractual 
provisions to provide accountability. None of these aims requires that contract 
become the only response to privatization.263 To the contrary, in the coming 
years we will need to think broadly and creatively about how best to respond 
to the threats posed by the outsourcing of governmental functions to non-
governmental entities. Only through such efforts will we be able to find ways 
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to protect crucial public law values in the era of privatization that is already 
upon us. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Domestic law scholars and policymakers have long debated issues 
surrounding privatization.1 Over the past twenty years, the U.S. government 
has increasingly contracted with private organizations to perform a variety of 
functions—from health care, 2  to education, 3  to welfare, 4  to prison 
                                                                                                                               
 
 † Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Article was first presented at a 
Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues of International Law, sponsored by the American Society of 
International Law, in The Hague, Netherlands in July 2005. The ideas contained here were also 
presented at a faculty workshop at George Washington University Law School, and at a conference on 
“The Future of the State in International Law,” held at the University of Virginia School of Law. I 
acknowledge the participants in all three events for helpful comments and suggestions. In addition, 
special thanks go to Dan Bedansky, Paul Schiff Berman, Rosa Brooks, Nestor M. Davidson, Robert W. 
Gordon, John Harrison, Paul Kahn, Harold Hongju Koh, David Luban, Jordan Paust, Leila Sadat, Steven 
Schooner, and Dinah Shelton for their useful contributions to this draft at various stages along the way. 
This Article was selected for inclusion in the Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum, held at Yale Law 
School in June 2006.
 1. A recent symposium issue of the Harvard Law Review even goes so far as to declare that 
we are in “an era of privatization.” See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1211 (2003). 
 2. See generally THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
PERSPECTIVES (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003). 
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management.5 While advocates of privatization have generally argued for the 
practice on efficiency grounds,6 critics have worried that, even if privatization 
may cut financial costs, it can threaten important public law values.7 Because 
many constitutional norms protect individuals only from government 
misconduct,8 and because courts have been largely unwilling to view such 
norms as applicable to private contractors,9 these critics have argued that 
privatization will dramatically reduce the scope of public law protections in 
the United States. 10  Others have sought a middle ground, arguing that 
privatization offers a means to extend public law values through the 
government contracts themselves, in a process of “publicization.”11  
To date, however, none of these scholars has squarely confronted the 
growing phenomenon of privatization in the international realm or its impact 
on the values embodied in public international law. Yet, with both nation-
states and international organizations increasingly privatizing foreign affairs 
functions, privatization is now as significant a phenomenon internationally as 
it is domestically. For example, states are turning to private actors to perform 
                                                                                                                               
 3. See Pearl Rock Kane & Christopher J. Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of 
Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION 203 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001) (discussing rise of 
privatized education generally and noting that number of charter schools grew from two to nearly 2,500 
from 1992 to 2002). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2000) (authorizing implementation of welfare programs 
“through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations”); see also Pamela Winston et al., 
Privatization of Welfare Services: A Review of the Literature 3-6 (Mathematica Policy Research Inc., 
Reference No. 8834-002, 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/privatization02/report/pdf 
(discussing increase in private welfare providers). 
 5. See ALLEN J. BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 4 (2001) (reporting that private 
prison facilities held 76,010 inmates at mid-year 2000). 
 6. See, e.g., Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, 
Evidence, Prospects, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Winter 1997, at 67, 72-75 (arguing that privatization 
is efficient in a variety of contexts); F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter, What Does Private 
Management Offer Public Education?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271 (2000) (arguing for private 
management of “public” schools). 
 7. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 439 
(2005) (arguing that prison privatization undermines core public law values of humanity and 
parsimony); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (arguing 
that privatization can threaten public law values embodied in constitutional norms). 
 8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . .”) (emphasis added).
 9. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association is not a state actor); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee, a corporation 
created by federal statute and given control over U.S. participation in the Olympics as well as exclusive 
oversight of private amateur sports organizations participating in international competition, is not a state 
actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (holding that private nursing homes providing 
long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries are not state actors, even though they operate under contract 
with the government and make need determinations authorized by statute); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding that private schools are not state actors even though the government 
contracted with the schools to fulfill its statutory obligation to provide education to special-needs 
students). But see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) 
(holding that a private organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school athletic events is 
a state actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a private doctor treating prisoners 
pursuant to a contract with a prison is a state actor). 
 10. See Dolovich, supra note 7, at 446-50 (arguing that private prisons fail to fulfill society’s 
obligations to inmates); Metzger, supra note 7, at 1373-74. 
 11. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1285, 1300 (2003). 
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core military, foreign aid, and diplomatic functions. Military privatization 
entered the popular consciousness in early 2004, when private contractors 
working as interrogators and translators for the U.S. government abused 
detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.12 But this kind of military privatization 
is only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, though the United States does not yet 
contract out direct combat functions, we now frequently turn to private actors 
to provide logistical support to those in combat on the battlefield as well as to 
aid in strategic planning and tactical advice.13 Other states, such as Sierra 
Leone, have used private contractors to engage in direct combat, 14  and 
international organizations have weighed the possibility of using private 
contractors to perform peacekeeping.15 In the foreign aid context, states and 
international organizations are increasingly entering into agreements with 
private non-profit and for-profit entities to deliver all forms of aid, including 
humanitarian relief, development assistance, and post-conflict 
reconstruction.16 Even diplomatic tasks such as peacekeeping negotiations are 
being undertaken by private actors in conjunction with governments and 
international organizations.17  
All of this privatization in the international sphere raises the same sort of 
question for international public law that domestic privatization raises for 
domestic public law: Will privatization erode fundamental public law values, 
such as human rights norms, norms against corruption and waste, and 
democratic process values?18 After all, international law norms, like many 
domestic constitutional norms, traditionally apply only to states. The 
Convention Against Torture, for example, generally prohibits only official 
                                                                                                                               
 
 12. See Douglas Jehl & Kate Zernike, Greater Urgency on Prison Interrogation Led to Use of 
Untrained Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at A11. 
 13. See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED 
MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003). 
 14. See Abraham McLaughlin, Guns for Hire Thrive in Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Mar. 15, 2004, at 6. 
 15. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 13, at 182-86. 
 16. See, e.g., BEYOND U.N. SUBCONTRACTING: TASK-SHARING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDING NGOS (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1998) [hereinafter U.N. 
SUBCONTRACTING]; Ian Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship Between 
Northern NGOs and Northern Governments, in STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT-NGO PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 7 (Ian Smillie & Henny Helmich eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
STAKEHOLDERS]. 
 17. See, e.g., James L. Taulbee & Marion V. Creekmore, NGO Mediation: The Carter Center, 
in MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOS 156 (Henry F. Carey & Oliver P. Richmond eds., 2003). 
 18. One can, of course, challenge the idea that certain values can even be labeled “public law 
values.” Indeed, as both critical legal studies and public choice theory teach, the line between the 
“public” and “private” is largely incoherent. Yet, that is precisely my point. Instead of seeing 
privatization solely as a threat to public values, as if there were some meaningful divide between the 
two, we should focus on the negotiated contractual relationships between the public and the private. As 
Jody Freeman has noted in discussing domestic privatization, “[t]he view that private actors . . . are 
menacing outsiders whose influence threatens to derail legitimate ‘public’ pursuits—features 
prominently in the dominant models of the field. And yet, private actors are also regulatory resources 
capable of contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy of administration. This realization suggests the 
possibility of harnessing private capacity to serve public goals.” Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-49 (2000). Similarly, I seek to use privatization 
contracts to pursue what are usually deemed the public ends of international law. 
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misconduct.19 Thus, we must ask: as more and more non-state contractors 
emerge on the international scene, will these individuals and groups 
necessarily fall through the cracks of international law and evade any public 
accountability? 
My answer to that question is “no,” and in this Article I suggest that the 
domestic U.S. administrative law literature may provide a useful set of 
responses to privatization that has been largely overlooked by international 
law scholars, policy-makers, and activists. In particular, I argue that 
possibilities for extending public law values inhere in the privatized 
relationship itself, particularly in the government contracts that are the very 
engine of privatization. Indeed, the contracts governments enter into with non-
state actors can include many provisions that would help to create both 
standards of behavior, performance benchmarks, and a means of providing 
some measure of public accountability. While such contractual provisions are 
not a panacea, they may be at least as effective as the relatively weak 
enforcement regime of public international law. 20  At the same time, by 
considering international privatization, I seek to open what I believe could be 
a fruitful dialogue between domestic administrative law scholars and 
international law scholars about possible responses. 
Significantly, while domestic scholars of privatization have not yet 
turned their attention to foreign affairs privatization, international law scholars 
have not really focused on privatization at all, and, in any event, have not 
seriously considered contract as a source of solutions to the potential threat to 
public law values that privatization may seem to pose. Of course, international 
law scholars have recognized concerns about how to apply international legal 
norms to non-state actors in general.21 But “non-state actors” is too broad a 
category because a private contractor is very different from, say, a guerrilla 
soldier. In particular, because privatization involves an increasing contractual 
relationship between governments (or international organizations) and private 
actors, contractual mechanisms for importing public accountability are 
potentially available with regard to privatization, whereas they obviously are 
                                                                                                                               
 
 19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14 (defining torture as 
certain activities designed to inflict pain or suffering when such “pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity”). Of course, this international “state action” requirement can be challenged on a 
variety of grounds. See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.  
 20. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, in considering the question of whether privatization 
undermines international law’s public values, we need to recognize that it is not as if state actors are 
always held accountable for failing to uphold these values. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for 
Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 135 (2005). After all, international law has often been criticized for having relatively 
weak enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17, 18-20 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) 
(noting lack of enforcement in international human rights law). And while this fact may not be cause for 
celebration, it does serve to remind us that we do not quite lose as much when we privatize in the 
international sphere as we do when, for example, we privatize domestically. 
 21. See, e.g., PHILIP ALSTON, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); Math 
Noortman, Non-State Actors in International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 59, 71-72 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001). 
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not relevant to many other instances in which non-state actors play a role in 
the international sphere.  
Moreover, to the extent that international law scholars and policy-
makers have proposed any solutions to potential problems created by 
privatization, these proposals fall far short. At the extreme, some have argued 
that the best response to military outsourcing, for example, is simply to 
oppose it altogether, because military functions are somehow “inherently” 
governmental or because state bureaucracies can be better monitored and held 
to account in court than private contractors can.22 However, those who simply 
resist privatization are misguided because the trend toward outsourcing of 
foreign affairs functions previously performed by state bureaucracies (at least 
in the recent past) is probably irreversible. The privatization train has not only 
already left the station, but has gone far down the track. Indeed, even those 
who seek to send the train back home should favor alternative solutions in the 
interim, because any return is likely to take a very long time.  
Others have argued that private actors with significant impact in the 
international sphere should be more formally brought within the normative 
framework of international law. Thus, with each wave of non-state actors—
such as guerrilla movements,23 terrorists,24 non-governmental organizations,25 
and corporations26—many international law practitioners and scholars have 
considered expanding the coverage of public international law to apply to 
each group. They have therefore contended either that states should (by treaty 
or customary international law) develop new norms that apply directly to 
these categories of non-state actors,27 or that any “state action” requirements 
contained in existing norms (again either in treaties or customary international 
law) should be interpreted expansively to apply to non-state actors linked to 
the state.28 At the same time, these scholars and practitioners have tended to 
focus on the need for courts and tribunals—in many cases new ones—to apply 
and interpret these norms.  
                                                                                                                               
 
 22. John Sifton, Remarks on Private Military Contractors at Conference at Georgetown 
University Law Center (Apr. 2005). 
 23. See, e.g., Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 29, 
30-33 (1983). 
 24. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 756-57 (2004). 
 25. See, e.g., Noortman, supra note 21, at 72. 
 26. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 524-30 (2001) (arguing that more international law norms should be 
extended to bind corporations directly); see also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2003) (same). But see Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect 
Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005) (urging 
caution). 
 27. See Junod, supra note 23, at 34-38 (discussing guerrillas and insurgents); Noortmann, 
supra note 21, at 71-74 (discussing the “legal personality” of NGOs under international law); Ratner, 
supra note 26, at 524-27 (discussing corporations).  
 28. See, e.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 
4, 8, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (stating that the “conduct of any State organ shall be considered an 
act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s conduct shall be attributed to the state if he 
or she is acting on the state’s instructions or under the state’s direction). 
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Yet this approach, though it is important because it results in the 
articulation of norms in the international sphere, can have only a limited 
effect. Even if the proposed courts and tribunals are established and fully 
functioning, and even if they expand the norms of international law to apply to 
the broad range of privatized action, these tribunals will never have the 
capacity to hold more than a limited number of individuals (and groups) to 
account. Accordingly, we need to seek alternative mechanisms for extending 
and implementing public law values to privatized actors in the international 
sphere. And though literature on corporate responsibility,29  NGOs,30  soft 
law,31 and transnational networks32 has attempted to address some informal 
modes of accountability, international law scholars have so far not sufficiently 
discussed the possibility of contract. 
This Article begins by laying out the scope of the problem, surveying the 
extent of foreign affairs privatization, the potential threat it poses to public 
law values, and the failure of current outsourcing contracts to address this 
problem. Using Iraq as a case study, I examine the publicly available military 
contracts as well as contracts to provide foreign aid, and I suggest serious 
deficiencies in the contracts thus far. Then, drawing on examples and insights 
from the domestic privatization literature, I set forth nine ways in which 
contractual provisions could be used to extend and enforce public law values 
in the foreign affairs privatization context. Specifically, I suggest that 
contracts be drafted to: explicitly extend relevant norms of public international 
law to private contractors, delineate training requirements, provide for 
enhanced monitoring both within the government and by independent third-
party monitors, establish clear performance benchmarks, require accreditation, 
mandate self-evaluation by the contractors, provide for governmental 
takeovers of failing contracts, include opportunities for public participation in 
the contract negotiation process, and enhance whistleblower protections and 
rights of third-party beneficiaries to enforce contractual terms. And, because 
these public values would be embodied in that quintessential private law 
instrument—the contract—they would more readily come within the purview 
of domestic courts or private arbitral bodies and so would rely less on 
international public law enforcement mechanisms (though those are possible 
as well). As a result, these contractual provisions may at least make some 
progress in attempting to ensure that private contractors are accountable both 
to the publics they serve and to those who are most affected by their work. 
                                                                                                                               
 
 29. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 952-58 (2004); Sean 
Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 
389, 424-30 (2005); Ratner, supra note 26, at 531-34; Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility 
and the International Law of Human Rights: The Next Lex Mercatoria, in ALSTON, supra note 21, at 
177-226.
 30. See Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical 
Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE U.N., AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 40-43 (Leon 
Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 1996) [hereinafter GLOBAL GOVERNANCE].
 31. See DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING 
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2003).
 32. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
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Of course, one might think that these proposals are unrealistic because 
one of the main reasons governments privatize is precisely to avoid the kind 
of accountability I propose. Yet governments are not monolithic, and there are 
undoubtedly many people within bureaucracies, such as contract monitors, 
who honestly wish to do their job and would therefore welcome (and lobby 
for) contractual mechanisms that increase accountability. In addition, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations can 
sometimes pressure states to adopt oversight regimes such as the ones I 
discuss. The problem is that the policymakers and scholars have not 
sufficiently focused on privatization or the possible accountability 
mechanisms that could be embodied in contracts. Thus, this Article seeks both 
to raise awareness about the ways in which contractual provisions might 
embody public law values and to stimulate a broader-ranging debate about the 
best way to respond to privatization in the international context. 
II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIVATIZATION AND THE THREAT TO PUBLIC LAW 
VALUES 
 States and international organizations are increasingly turning to private 
entities, both for-profit and non-profit, to fulfill a broad range of foreign 
affairs functions. Just as they are contracting with private organizations to 
provide domestic services such as welfare, health care, education, and prison 
management, they are also outsourcing military and intelligence activities, 
foreign aid, and diplomatic tasks. Yet, until recently, this trend has largely 
escaped scholarly attention. Moreover, to the extent that scholars have 
addressed this issue, they have not examined the full scope of privatization 
across a number of different areas of state activity.33 This Part briefly maps 
out the broad-ranging nature of foreign affairs privatization and then discusses 
the dangers such outsourcing poses to public law values.  
                                                                                                                               
 
 33. To date, military/security privatization has generated the most scholarly attention. See 
generally SINGER, supra note 13; Tina Garmon, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: 
Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 325 (2003); Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call To Recognize and Regulate 
Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2003); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The 
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 
(2004); Peter Warren Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004); Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a 
New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World 
Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75 (1998). Other scholars have focused on privatized foreign aid. See 
Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 30, at 1; Smillie, supra note 16, at 7. However, not only do these 
specialized studies necessarily tell only part of the story, they do not systematically explore the 
possibility of using contractual mechanisms to hold private actors accountable, nor do they draw on the 
domestic administrative law literature on privatization. At the same time, domestic administrative law 
scholars have not generally applied their insights to the international context, though there are important 
exceptions. See generally, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM 154-55 (2004) (identifying the democracy deficit created by 
privatization and situating that deficit within a global context); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: 
How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy, 46 B.C. 
L. REV. 989 (2005) (identifying the problems of military privatization).  
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A. The Scope of Foreign Affairs Privatization: Military, Foreign Aid, and 
Diplomatic Functions 
 The degree to which states and international organizations have farmed 
out foreign affairs activities to private actors is truly breathtaking. It would not 
be an exaggeration to say that the U.S. government has hired private entities 
to help fight our wars, to deliver much of our foreign aid, and to play an 
important role mediating our conflicts and engaging in other diplomatic 
activities. Many other states are pursuing a similar course. International 
organizations are likewise turning to private entities to support peacekeeping 
and to deliver all manner of humanitarian, development, and post-conflict 
reconstruction assistance, as well as to participate in peacemaking 
negotiations. 
 The privatization of military functions is perhaps the most remarkable 
example. Probably no function of government is deemed more 
quintessentially a “state” function than the military protection of the state 
itself, and some scholars of privatization in the domestic sphere have assumed 
that the military is one area where privatization does not, or should not, 
occur.34 Indeed, some have argued that, by hiring private armies to keep itself 
secure, the state would threaten its own existence because it would have no 
way to control these private military actors.35  
 Yet, governments around the world, including the United States, are 
increasingly hiring private military companies to perform core military 
functions.36 For decades, of course, the U.S. government has entered into 
agreements with private companies to build weapons and other equipment, as 
well as to provide the basic goods necessary to run a government agency—
everything from desks to office supplies.37 However, such contracting activity 
now covers services to active troops in the field.38 These activities include not 
only support services, such as food, accommodations, and sanitation for 
troops on the battlefield, but also core functions such as intelligence gathering, 
communications, weapons maintenance, and even troop training.39 According 
to one commentator, “while contractors have long accompanied U.S. armed 
forces, the wholesale outsourcing of U.S. military services since the 1990s is 
unprecedented.”40  
 Indeed, if one looks to U.S. forces deployed on the battlefield, the ratio 
of private contractors to troops has increased dramatically in the past fifteen 
                                                                                                                               
 
 34. Cf. Freeman, supra note 11, at 1295, 1300. 
 35. See, e.g., Rosky, supra note 33, at 882-83 (stating that a state in which the supply of 
military force is entirely private is more vulnerable to military revolt than one in which the supply of 
military force is entirely public and that “the intensity of force justifies the state’s monopoly of the 
supply of force”). 
 36. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 3-17.  
 37. See Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 369, 371-72 (2004). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 416 n.312. 
 40. SINGER, supra note 13, at 16. 
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years. In the first Gulf War, the ratio was roughly one to one hundred;41 in the 
current war in Iraq, the ratio is one to ten.42 Although the United States has 
not yet used the employees of private companies in actual combat roles,43 it 
has deployed them to fulfill tasks such as military intelligence gathering, troop 
training, weapons maintenance, and support functions that are very close to 
combat; these private actors even have the power to wield force in a variety of 
circumstances.44  Other countries, such as Sierra Leone and Angola, have 
explicitly hired private armies.45  In many modern conflicts, these private 
military companies have played a decisive role.46
 The pervasiveness of the U.S. military’s use of contractors captured 
media attention with news of their role in Iraq. When stories surfaced that 
U.S. military personnel had abused detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, it 
soon became clear that private contractors employed by CACI, Inc. and 
working under an agreement with the Department of the Interior had 
participated in the abuse.47 Indeed, intelligence operatives may actually have 
given orders to uniformed military. 48  Translators hired under a similar 
contract with the firm Titan, Inc. were also implicated in the abuse.49 News of 
gruesome security contractor killings by Iraqi insurgents has sparked 
additional popular attention.50
 Yet, CACI is not an anomaly. Firms such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root 
(KBR) have for years built and maintained military bases, transported troops 
and equipment to and on the battlefield, repaired and maintained roads and 
vehicles, distributed water and food to troops, washed laundry, refueled 
equipment, attended to hazardous materials, and performed related 
environmental services,51 earning roughly $1.7 billion annually from military 
                                                                                                                               
 
 41. George Cahlink, Army of Contractors, GOV’T EXEC, Feb. 1, 2002, at 43, available at 
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CONT. L.J. 233, 256-58 (2000).  
 44. Vernon, supra note 37, at 407-09.  
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POLICE BRIGADE, 26, 36, 48 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]; SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF 
COMMAND 32-34, 61 (2004); Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15.  
 48. HERSH, supra note 47, at 61. 
 49. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 47, at 26, 36, 48; Brinkley & Glanz, supra note 47, at 
A15. 
 50. James Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, for Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at 
A1. 
 51. See, e.g., Halliburton Company, About KBR, http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/aboutKBR/ 
392 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31: 383 
  
work.52 Beyond this logistical support, other companies provide core military 
functions such as troop training and intelligence gathering. For example, since 
1996, another U.S company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated 
(MPRI) has run the ROTC training programs at universities around the 
country and has played a key role in numerous programs to educate U.S. 
forces, including officer training, war gaming, and tactical planning.53  In 
recent years, moreover, MPRI has expanded its services to a wide variety of 
countries, including Croatia, Bosnia, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea,54 as well as to regional intergovernmental 
programs such as the African Crisis Response Initiative.55 Finally, and most 
controversially, military companies have provided direct combat services. For 
example, the now-dissolved South African company Executive Outcomes, 
which drew its personnel largely from the apartheid-era South African 
Defense Force, won contracts with governments in Angola, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, Congo, and others to engage in 
direct combat during the 1980s and 1990s.56 Indeed, its activities in Sierra 
Leone and Angola are widely believed to have altered the outcome of the 
conflicts in those states.57  
 Although privatization in the military context has received far more 
attention, overseas aid is another area in which states are also increasingly 
turning to private contractors to fulfill functions formerly performed directly 
by the state.58 From emergency humanitarian relief, to long-term development 
assistance, to post-conflict reconstruction programs, private actors under 
contract with the United States, other governments, and international 
organizations are taking a larger and larger role. The most dramatic surge in 
privatized aid has involved humanitarian relief. The United States, for 
example, has contracted with private companies such as KBR to build refugee 
camps,59 and with nonprofit NGOs such as Save the Children to deliver relief 
supplies and medical services.60 For fiscal year 2003, the USAID Office of 
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance spent sixty-six percent of its nearly $300 
million budget through NGOs. 61 Other countries and international 
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 52. SINGER, supra note 13, at 139. 
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 55. Id. at 131. 
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 57. See Zarate, supra note 33, at 94-97. 
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 59. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 144. 
 60. See USAID, DCHA/PVC-ASHA PORTFOLIO, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at B-5 (2005), available 
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organizations are similarly turning to NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid.62 
Longer-term development aid has followed a similar trend. By the mid-1980s, 
development agencies had begun to shift their focus from general funding for 
foreign governments to more targeted direct support both to grassroots 
organizations helping to eradicate poverty and to other civil society 
institutions seen as necessary for democracy and development.63 In the United 
States, for example, the government now uses both international and foreign 
NGOs to deliver much of its aid overseas, rather than providing aid directly to 
foreign governments.64 As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan make clear, 
privatization is also taking place in the arena of post-conflict reconstruction, 
with multimillion dollar contracts awarded not only to nonprofit organizations 
but to for-profit corporations as well.65 Indeed, so far in Iraq USAID has 
awarded fifteen contracts worth a total of $3.2 billion to for-profit companies, 
while it has awarded only six grants worth $40 million to nonprofit 
organizations.66  
 In addition to military and foreign assistance functions, governments 
have also turned to private entities to assist in peacemaking and other 
diplomatic tasks. The Carter Center, probably the best-known organization in 
this field, has engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts to avoid or end 
conflicts at the behest of governments around the world.67 For example, in 
1994, former President Carter assisted the U.S. government in reopening talks 
with North Korea, negotiating an agreement for the peaceful departure of 
Raoul Cedras from power in Haiti (thereby averting the need for increased 
U.S. military intervention), and also brokering a ceasefire in Bosnia.68 More 
recently, the Center has engaged in peacemaking activities at the request of 
                                                                                                                               
 
 62. Smillie, supra note 16, at 9 (describing foreign aid in France, Sweden, and the EU); see 
also Andrew S. Natsios, NGOs and the U.N. System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or 
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 65. See USAID, ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ: ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES (2005), 
available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activities.html [hereinafter ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE]. 
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numerous governments, including Uganda, Sudan, and Ecuador. 69  Other 
organizations have performed similar roles around the world.70
 Finally, it is important to note that, in addition to states, international 
organizations such as the United Nations have also turned to private entities.71 
For example, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) has entered partnerships with hundreds of NGOs around 
the world for services including refugee protection, community services, field 
security, child protection, engineering, and telecommunications in emergency 
relief situations. 72  Although the United Nations has not deployed private 
military firms in combat roles,73 some policymakers and commentators have 
suggested that such a step would provide badly needed help to peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement operations.74 And even those who do not endorse a 
direct combat role for private firms nonetheless argue that the United Nations 
should privatize military logistics functions, much as the U.S. government has 
done.75  
 To be sure, one might argue that privatization in all of these areas of 
foreign affairs is nothing new. With respect to the military, mercenaries 
(loosely defined as soldiers working for private gain) have appeared 
throughout history. From the Swiss guards of the Middle Ages, to the 
merchant-armies of the British and Dutch East India Companies during the 
colonial period, to the privateers of early America, to the French Foreign 
Legion still active today, mercenaries have played a significant role over the 
centuries. 76  Indeed, before the Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the 
emergence of the state system that eventually gave rise to large standing 
national armies, mercenaries were the norm rather than the exception.77 By the 
twentieth century, however, apart from some post-colonial wars of 
independence (where mercenaries often fought against national liberation 
movements), the bulk of military security work has been performed by 
professionalized, bureaucratized armies and not private actors.78 It is against 
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this backdrop that we have seen, over the past two decades, the increasing re-
privatization of military functions. 
 Likewise, the privatization of foreign aid and diplomacy are not wholly 
recent developments. With respect to foreign aid, private groups from the 
United States funneled aid overseas for specific causes long before the 
government developed foreign assistance programs.79 Indeed, the practice of 
government-sponsored foreign assistance did not develop in a significant way 
in the United States until the initiation of the Marshall Plan during the period 
following World War II.80 However, from the 1950s through the 1970s, much 
of the aid consisted of direct grants to needy countries.81 In contrast, as noted 
previously, over the past two decades the government has delivered more and 
more foreign aid through nongovernmental actors. 82  And with respect to 
diplomacy, private organizations have long played a role in ongoing peace 
negotiations and other efforts, but the high-level diplomatic work of 
organizations such as the Carter Center is new and distinctive.83
 The forces driving this trend toward privatization are not fully 
understood, but the dominant rationale articulated by most scholars of the 
subject is the promise of cutting costs.84  The government need not offer 
pensions or benefits to employees of private companies working under 
contract, and it can hire contractors on a short-term basis, thereby decreasing 
the size of government bureaucracies. Moreover, unlike many governmental 
employees, private contractors are typically not unionized. The lack of 
unionization fuels the political support of those on the right, and, at least in the 
United States, there tends to be broad bi-partisan support for any trend that 
seems to make government “smaller” and “more efficient.” In addition, in the 
case of the military, private military companies may offer governments 
greater flexibility. Such companies are touted for their ability to work 
quickly,85 and in states with ill-equipped, poorly functioning militaries, private 
companies can provide badly needed expertise to help train, or even replace, 
                                                                                                                               
 
 79. The international non-governmental organization movement has its roots in missionary 
activities that date back to the sixteenth century. Smillie, supra note 16, at 8. Beginning with the 
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government troops. 86  Using private military companies can also offset 
shortages of troops by offering a rapid means of growing a state’s military 
capacity, and states can deploy their forces with lower domestic political costs 
because fewer uniformed troops are put at risk, thus keeping official casualty 
figures down. 87  Finally, some have suggested that the growth of private 
military firms has been fueled in part by the labor pool created as many 
military dictatorships and their accompanying security forces have been 
dismantled during transitions to democracy.88
 Foreign aid privatization also appears to be motivated largely by a desire 
to cut costs. Certainly in the United States the outsourcing of aid is linked to 
the political push for smaller government, combined with weak political 
support for foreign aid generally. Indeed, USAID, perhaps motivated in part 
by the need to justify its activities to an increasingly skeptical Congress, was 
one of the first agencies in the United States to take then-Vice President Al 
Gore’s “Reinventing Government” message to heart, declaring in 1994 that 
“USAID is now fully committed to reinventing itself as a more efficient, 
effective, and results-oriented organization.”89  
 The privatization of diplomatic tasks such as peacemaking has received 
even less scholarly attention than other forms of foreign affairs privatization, 
and the reasons behind this trend are thus even less clear. It appears, however, 
that the growing use of private entities in this arena has stemmed from the 
high-level experience of those such as former President Carter who have 
founded and worked for such organizations, as well as the organizations’ 
independence, which frees them from some of the political costs of sensitive 
diplomatic efforts.90
 Thus, the recent rise of privatization does represent a shift, at least as 
compared to the recent past, away from the large, highly-bureaucratized state. 
Just as states are outsourcing their domestic functions, they are also 
outsourcing their foreign affairs activities. And while the surge in foreign 
affairs privatization raises many questions that merit further study,91 a central 
issue presented by this trend is whether increased outsourcing undermines the 
public law values that apply primarily to state actors. 
                                                                                                                               
 
 86. See Garmon, supra note 33, at 331-34. 
 87. Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19. The promise of placing fewer uniformed troops at risk is, 
of course, not always fulfilled. For example, after four Blackwater security contractors were killed in 
Fallujah in March, 2004, and their burned bodies hung from a bridge, the American military launched 
major assaults on Fallujah in April and November of that year, resulting in some of the highest U.S. 
military casualty numbers of the war. 
 88. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, supra note 45, at 32. 
 89. USAID, ENHANCING AID’S ABILITY TO MANAGE FOR RESULTS (1994). 
 90. See, e.g., Taulbee & Creekmore, supra note 17, at 170. 
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virtually non-existent monitoring has cost taxpayers millions of dollars). 
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B. The Threat to Public Law Values 
 Just as the protections contained in the U.S. Constitution are generally 
viewed as prohibitions on state misconduct only,92 the principal international 
human rights and humanitarian law instruments of the twentieth century—the 
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights,93 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,94 the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,95 the Genocide Convention,96 the Convention Against 
Torture,97 the Fourth Geneva Conventions,98 and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court99—were drafted primarily with states in mind. 
As such, at least in the conventional account of public international law, states 
are seen as both the primary parties to the treaties and the central bearers of 
rights and responsibilities. These instruments do grant individuals rights, of 
course—such as the right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or the right to a fair trial—but these are generally conceived 
primarily as rights against the state.100 Conversely, individuals can be held 
criminally liable, but usually only if some connection to the state is 
demonstrated. And while there are some exceptions within the overarching 
framework of public international law—for example, individuals can be 
convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity (as defined in the recent 
statute of the International Criminal Court) regardless of any connection to a 
state apparatus101—state action (or at least a link to it) still remains at the core 
of most conceptions of international law liability. 
 The private contractor interrogators and translators implicated in the 
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison provide a notable example of how these non-state 
actors might fall through the cracks of this traditional, state-centered approach 
to public international law. Although the Geneva Conventions and the 
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 101. The Genocide Convention provides explicitly that “[p]ersons committing genocide or any 
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Convention Against Torture clearly prohibit any abuses committed by US 
military personnel, 102  the treaties’ applicability to non-state actors is 
ambiguous, and fora for holding non-state actors accountable are limited.103 
The U.S. government’s use of private contractors to transport terrorism 
suspects to countries known to practice torture104 has raised similar questions 
because again, while the Convention Against Torture prohibits governments 
from taking such actions, its applicability to private actors is ambiguous.105
 Private military companies engaging in direct combat also arguably fall 
through the cracks of current international law provisions, despite probably 
being the most notorious for committing atrocities. Although multiple treaties 
ban the use of certain categories of mercenaries outright, broad gaps in the 
definition of “mercenary” leave most types of work by private military 
companies outside the treaties’ prohibitions.106 For example, in Sierra Leone 
in the 1990s officers of Executive Outcomes, working under contract with the 
government, reportedly ordered employees carrying out air strikes against 
rebels to “[k]ill everybody,” even though the employees had told their 
superiors they could not distinguish between civilians and rebels.107 While 
such a command would almost certainly constitute a war crime if ordered by a 
military or civilian authority in the chain of command, it is less clear that such 
actions committed by private contractors would qualify, at least absent inquiry 
into the extent of the contractor’s link to the government.  
 Abuses committed by private actors who deliver aid also raise 
complicated questions about the application of international law. Although aid 
workers do not by any means regularly mistreat aid beneficiaries, such 
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 106. See Milliard, supra note 33, at 19-69 (summarizing treaties). 
 107. Elizabeth Rubin, An Army of One’s Own, HARPER’S, Feb. 1997, at 48. 
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incidents occur more often than one might suspect. For example, employees 
of Dyncorp Inc., a private corporation that was charged with training police in 
Bosnia in the 1990s under a contract with the U.S. government, were 
“implicated in a sex-trafficking scandal” involving acts of rape, sexual abuse, 
and exploitation.108 Even staff members of not-for-profit organizations have at 
times been implicated in abuses. Indeed, a recent study of refugees and 
internally displaced persons in West African camps in Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone reported widespread rape and sexual exploitation of women and 
children by many actors, including aid workers. 109  The aid workers and 
peacekeeping forces allegedly relied on their positions of relative power to use 
“the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit the refugee 
population as a tool of exploitation.”110 In some camps, it appears that even 
necessities such as using a toilet were sometimes conditioned on the 
willingness to perform sexual favors.111 Although, as in the military context, 
such abuses committed by governmental actors generally violate international 
agreements, the same acts committed by non-state actors fall into a gray 
area.112
 Even outside the human rights context, the principal regional treaties 
seeking to deter corruption, for example, apply primarily to misconduct 
involving governmental actors. 113  Yet, foreign aid contractors have been 
implicated in fraud and waste. Indeed, Kellogg Brown & Root’s more than 
$10 billion in contracts with the U.S. government in Iraq “have been dogged 
                                                                                                                               
 
 108. Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19. Although Dyncorp offers security services under the 
contract, I include it and other such contracts within the foreign aid section because they provide 
assistance to a foreign country, as opposed to assistance to the U.S. military. 
 109. UNHCR & SAVE THE CHILDREN UK, NOTE FOR IMPLEMENTING AND OPERATIONAL 
PARTNERS ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE & EXPLOITATION (2002), available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/6010f9ed3c651c93c1256b6d00560fca; see also 
Michel Alger & Francoise Bouchet-Soulinier, Humanitarian Spaces: Spaces of Exception, in IN THE 
SHADOW, supra note 66, at 297, 302 (describing such abuses in refugee and IDP camps in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone); Fabrice Weissman, Sierra Leone: Peace at Any Price, in IN THE SHADOW, 
supra note 66 (describing sexual exploitation by aid workers in IDP camps in Sierra Leone). 
 110. See Scott A. Levin, Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by U.N. Peacekeepers, 19 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 833, 834-35 (2003). 
 111. See Malinda M. Schmiechen, Parallel Lives, Uneven Justice: An Analysis of Rights, 
Protection and Redress for Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Camps, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 473, 490 (2003). 
 112. For example, rape or other sexual abuse committed by a public official would in many 
cases constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture, but similar actions taken by a non-state 
actor would not, unless undertaken with the “consent or acquiescence” of such an official. Torture 
Convention, supra note 97, art. 1. Rape and related sexual violence are also considered war crimes if 
committed in either international or internal armed conflict, but only those individuals acting under the 
authority of the actual parties to the conflict may be held criminally responsible for such acts. ICC 
Statute, supra note 99, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). Though non-state actors can commit crimes 
against humanity, such activity would only qualify if it is “widespread or systematic” and conducted 
pursuant to an organizational plan or policy. Id. arts. 7(1)(g), 7(2)(a). 
 113. For example, states parties to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions agree to criminalize bribery, but bribery is defined only as payment to public 
officials to secure a pecuniary or other advantage. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter 
OECD Convention]. Payment to a government contractor providing services in order to secure a 
subcontract, for example, or some other advantage, would not clearly fall within the prohibition. 
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by charges of preferential treatment, overbilling, cost overruns, and waste.”114 
Elsewhere, employees of Custer Battles, a company that was awarded two $16 
million contracts by USAID to provide security for the Baghdad airport and 
distribute Iraqi dinars, 115  reportedly chartered a flight to Beirut with $10 
million in new Iraqi dinars in their luggage—which were promptly 
confiscated by Lebanese officials.116 The company also set up sham Cayman 
Islands subsidiaries to submit invoices, and regularly overcharged for 
materials—in one case charging the United States $10 million for materials 
that it purchased for $3.5 million.117 In short, corruption and fraud have been 
rampant in the Iraqi contracts. Yet, legal oversight (and democratic 
accountability) is limited because such contractors operate beyond many of 
the transparency rules that would apply to government entities.118
 Thus, widespread privatization potentially threatens a wide variety of 
public law values.119 One response to this problem, of course, is to interpret 
(or amend) the international law norms themselves either to remove any state 
action requirement, or at any rate to construe such a requirement leniently. 
Indeed, at least some of the conventional state-centered story of international 
law that I have recounted has long been subject to challenge. For example, the 
U.N.’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts aims to make clear that the “conduct of any State organ shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s 
conduct shall be attributed to the state if he or she is acting on the state’s 
                                                                                                                               
 
 114. Warren Hoge, U.N. Criticizes Iraq Occupation Oil Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at 
A21. In addition, the chief contracting officer for the Army Corps of Engineers has publicly accused the 
Army of granting preferential treatment to KBR (through its parent company, Halliburton) in awarding 
contracts in Iraq and Bosnia, in violation of U.S. contracting regulations. Erik Eckholm, A Top U.S. 
Contracting Official for the Army Calls for an Inquiry in the Halliburton Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2004, at A13. 
 115. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4. 
 116. Id. at 1-2 (statement of Alan Grayson). 
 117. Id. at 2 (statement of Alan Grayson). These allegations resulted in a private enforcement 
suit under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000). See Yochai J. Dreazen, Attorney 
Pursues Iraq Contractor Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at B1 (discussing the suit). Indeed, in 
March 2006 a jury ordered Custer Battles to return $10 million in ill-gotten funds to the government. See 
id. Yet, though the district court judge in that case had permitted the suit to proceed, United States ex 
rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), it is unclear whether the 
verdict will ultimately hold up on appeal and whether such False Claims Act suits will be deemed 
sustainable in this context.
 118. See infra text accompanying notes 129-130. As noted in note 117, supra, it is unclear 
whether or not the False Claims Act will ultimately provide an effective avenue for legal accountability. 
 119. To be sure, as I have argued elsewhere, these gaps may not be as significant as they first 
appear. See Dickinson, supra note 20. To begin with, the baseline of accountability for state actors 
performing foreign affairs functions is not that great. Such actors are not held accountable for violating 
the norms that effectuate public law values that often. Thus, the shift to private actors does not represent 
a dramatic decline in accountability—certainly not as great a decline as in the domestic setting, where 
state actors are at least sometimes held accountable for failing to uphold public law values. This 
comparison places the perils of privatization in perspective.  
  In addition, alternative avenues of legal accountability may exist under private law. As in 
the domestic privatization context, immunities applicable to governmental employees arguably do not 
apply, thereby opening up potential private law actions such as tort claims. Thus, in some ways private 
contractors may face a greater risk of legal liability than governmental actors. 
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instructions or under the state’s direction.120 Likewise, courts and tribunals 
have at times applied principles of state responsibility for instrumentalities to 
impute the liability of companies onto states. 121  And some courts have 
suggested that certain international law norms, such as the laws of war, can be 
used to hold non-state actors directly accountable, at least in some 
circumstances. 122  Alternatively, non-state actors can be held liable under 
theories of complicity or aiding and abetting.123 Thus, it would be wrong to 
characterize international law as completely impotent with regard to private 
contractors.124
 Yet, though I am sympathetic to efforts to revise or interpret the norms 
of public international law to apply to private contractors, I argue that such 
efforts should not be the only response to privatization in the international 
realm. Indeed, public international law norms are imperfectly enforced in the 
best of circumstances, and any interpretational ambiguities with regard to 
contractors only compounds the practical difficulties. Thus, those concerned 
that public values may be lost in a privatized world would be well-advised to 
look in other directions as well. And, as we will see, the contractual 
relationship that creates the very structure of privatization may itself offer a 
means of promoting and enforcing public law values, and it is to such avenues 
of accountability that we now turn. 
III. CONTRACT AS A TOOL TO EXTEND AND ENFORCE PUBLIC LAW VALUES 
Contracts between governmental entities and the private organizations 
providing services can themselves serve as vehicles to promote public law 
values. Contractual terms can specify norms and structure the contractual 
relationship in ways that spur contractors to implement those norms. Thus, 
although typically conceived as the quintessential private law form, contracts 
used in this way can be a tool to “publicize” the privatization relationship.125  
                                                                                                                               
 
 120. See supra note 28; see also, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private 
Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801 (2002). 
 121. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding Iran responsible for corporation over which it exercised control); Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. 
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 122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on the Defense Motion on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 61 (Aug. 10, 1995) (noting that war crimes include “crimes committed by any person ... 
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Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of 
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals”).  
 123. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005). 
 124. See generally, e.g., Chia Lehnardt, Private Military Companies and State Responsibility, 
in MARKET FORCES: REGULATING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt 
eds., forthcoming 2007) (describing ways in which international law holds states accountable for acts of 
private military companies). 
 125. See Freeman, supra note 11. 
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Administrative law scholars have recently explored this insight in the 
domestic context. Most notably, Jody Freeman has suggested that states 
“could require compliance with both procedural and substantive standards that 
might otherwise be inapplicable or unenforceable against private 
providers.” 126  Yet this work has focused on privatization of healthcare, 
welfare, and prisons in the United States and has not considered privatization 
of military, foreign aid, and diplomatic activities. Meanwhile, as noted 
previously,127 few if any international law scholars, policymakers, or NGOs 
have considered the possibilities of using contractual terms in the international 
context. Accordingly, this Part seeks to bridge the gap between domestic 
administrative law and international law scholarship by exploring a variety of 
contractual mechanisms that might be used to extend public law values to 
privatized foreign affairs.  
Specifically, I discuss nine contracting practices that could be deployed 
in the foreign affairs arena: (1) incorporating public law standards in 
contractual terms; (2) requiring that private contractors receive training; (3) 
enhancing contractual monitoring, both by internal governmental actors and 
third parties; (4) requiring that contractors receive accreditation from 
independent organizations; (5) laying out clear performance benchmarks; (6) 
mandating contractor self-evaluation; (7) enhancing governmental termination 
provisions and allowing for partial governmental takeover of contracts; (8) 
allowing for beneficiary participation in contract design; and (9) strengthening 
enforcement mechanisms, including greater whistleblower protections and 
more opportunities for third-party beneficiary suits. In considering these 
possibilities, I will use Iraq as a case study, examining all of the publicly 
available contracts the U.S. government has negotiated to support the U.S. 
military or to provide for foreign aid to Iraq. Nevertheless, these same 
principles would apply to other types of contracts negotiated by states or 
international organizations with contractors providing a variety of foreign 
affairs functions. 
The contractual mechanisms I discuss are particularly important in the 
foreign affairs context because many of these contracts are negotiated in 
secret, without competition, on a “no bid basis,” based on exceptions to the 
normal requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).128  For 
example, with respect to the U.S. government’s foreign affairs contracts in 
Iraq, in many cases it is impossible for the public or a watchdog group even to 
obtain the text of the contracts, either because government officials have kept 
them secret for security reasons,129 or because the contractors have exercised 
what is essentially a veto, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), for 
certain types of commercial information.130 Problems posed by secrecy are 
reinforced by problems of conflict of interest because many of the contracts 
                                                                                                                               
 
 126. Freeman, supra note 18, at 634.  
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28. 
 128. See Megan A. Kinsey, Note, Transparency in Government Procurement: An International 
Consensus?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 161-62 (2004). 
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(1) (2000). 
 130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(4) (2000). 
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are awarded to firms run by former government personnel. A 2003 study by 
the Center for Public Integrity reports that sixty percent of the companies that 
received contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan “had employees or board members 
who either served in or had close ties to the executive branch for Republican 
and Democratic administrations, for members of Congress of both parties, or 
at the highest levels of the military.”131 Thus, it is essential that, at the very 
least, the contracts themselves incorporate public values.   
A. Incorporating Public Law Standards in Contractual Terms 
First, of course, the contracts could explicitly require that the contractors 
obey the norms that implement public law values. Specifically, the terms of 
each agreement could provide that private contractors must abide by relevant 
legal rules applicable to governmental actors. Such contractual terms would 
obviate the need to show that the private actors were functioning as an 
extension of government so as to satisfy any state action requirement that 
might arise under domestic and international legal regimes. Instead, the norms 
applicable to governmental actors would simply be part of the contractual 
terms, enforceable like any other provisions, regardless of state action. 
In the domestic setting, such provisions are commonplace. As a term in 
their contracts with privately run prisons, for example, many states require 
compliance with constitutional, federal, state, and private standards for prison 
operation and inmates’ rights. 132  In addition, contractual agreements may 
require contractors to provide for hearings and review of contractor actions.133  
 The U.S. government’s military and foreign aid contracts in Iraq, by 
contrast, are woefully inadequate on this score. To be sure, a 2005 Department 
of Defense (DOD) document providing general instructions regarding 
contracting practices does state that contractors “shall abide by applicable 
laws, regulations, DoD policy, and international agreements….”134 Yet, of the 
sixty publicly available Iraq contracts,135 none contains specific provisions 
requiring contractors to obey human rights, anticorruption, or transparency 
                                                                                                                               
 
 131. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, WINNING CONTRACTORS: U.S. CONTRACTORS REAP 
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 133. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 608 (discussing contractual hearing and oversight 
mechanisms in the nursing home context). 
 134. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, No. 3020.41, § 6.1 (Oct. 3, 2005). 
 135. See Center for Public Integrity, Contracts and Reports, http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
wow/resources.aspx?act=resources (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Contracts and Reports] 
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norms. The agreements between the U.S. government and CACI to supply 
military interrogators starkly illustrate this point. The intelligence personnel 
were hired pursuant to a standing “blanket purchase agreement” between the 
Department of the Interior and CACI, negotiated in 2000.136 Under such an 
agreement the procuring agency need not request specific services at the time 
the agreement is made but rather may enter task orders as the need arises. In 
2003, eleven task orders, worth $66.2 million were entered (none of which 
was the result of competitive bidding).137 The orders specify only that CACI 
would provide interrogation support and analysis work for the U.S. Army in 
Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel, intelligence report writing, and 
screening/interrogation of detainees at established holding areas.” 138  
Significantly, the orders do not expressly require that the private contractor 
interrogators comply with international human rights or humanitarian law 
rules such as those contained in the Torture Convention or the Geneva 
Conventions. Likewise, although the contractors are subject to international 
and domestic laws prohibiting the bribery of government officials,139 as well 
as the general terms of the FAR,140 none of the contracts specifically prohibits 
the contractors themselves from accepting bribes, an area that remains 
ambiguous in domestic and international law. Similarly, the contracts do not 
provide terms specifying the applicability of FOIA, which would help make 
contractor activities more transparent.  
B. Requiring that Private Contractors Receive Training 
Foreign affairs contracts could also explicitly require that contractors 
receive training in activities that would promote public law values. Such 
training, as a contractual requirement, could help instill in contractor 
employees a sense of the importance of these values. At the same time, 
training could provide employees with concrete recommendations about how 
to implement these values in specific, challenging situations. 
Again, in the domestic setting such training provisions are 
commonplace. A standard term in state agreements with companies that 
manage private prisons, for example, requires companies to certify that the 
training they provide to personnel is comparable to that offered to state 
employees.141 Such training would normally include instruction concerning 
legal limits on the use of force and examples of what those limits mean in 
circumstances likely to arise in the prison setting.  
                                                                                                                               
 
 136. See Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and CACI Premier Technology, 
Inc., No. NBCHA010005 (2000) [hereinafter DOI-CACI]. 
 137. Work Orders Nos. 000035D004, 000036D004, 000037D004, 000038D0004, 
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 140. 48 C.F.R. §§ 2.000 (2006).  
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Yet, while the 2005 DOD instructions require documentation of training 
concerning appropriate use of force,142 none of the publicly available Iraq 
contracts appears to require such training. Indeed, although a few of the 
agreements require that contractors hire employees with a certain number of 
years’ experience, 143  none specifies that the contractor must provide any 
particular training at all. For example, the U.S. government’s agreement with 
Chugach McKinley, Inc. to screen and hire a broad range of military support 
personnel—from doctors to “special mission advisers”—says nothing about 
whether such personnel will receive training in applicable international law 
standards, even though such personnel may be in a position to commit 
abuses. 144  The U.S. government’s agreements with CACI to provide 
interrogators are likewise completely silent on whether interrogators will 
receive education in international humanitarian and human rights law, training 
that U.S. military interrogators would normally receive.145 Not surprisingly 
then, an Army Inspector General report on the conditions that led to the Abu 
Ghraib scandal concluded that 35% of CACI’s Iraqi interrogators did not even 
have any “formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques,” 
let alone training in international law norms.146 This omission is particularly 
glaring given the highly volatile Iraqi environment.  
 Anti-corruption training would also be useful for foreign affairs 
contractors generally, and for contracts in Iraq specifically. Iraq ranks among 
the worst countries in the world on Transparency International’s corruption 
index,147 and it is no surprise that such corruption reaches U.S. contractors 
operating there. Indeed, one former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
official, Alan Grayson, has asserted that lack of employee screening and 
training led to the shocking abuses committed by Custer Battles.148 Yet such 
contracts say nothing about training for contractors in practices to avoid 
corruption. And while training requirements undoubtedly would increase the 
cost of the contracts, the fraud and waste that could be deterred with better 
training might well offset such increases. 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
 
 142. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, supra note 134, § 6.3.5.3.4. 
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 148. See supra text accompanying notes 115–118. 
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C. Enhancing Contractual Monitoring, Both by Internal Governmental 
Actors and by Third Parties 
Provisions could also be made for increased contract monitoring, which 
could provide an important check on abuses. Such monitoring should include, 
to begin with, sufficient numbers of trained and experienced governmental 
contract monitors. At the same time, governmental ombudspersons—leaders 
of independent offices charged with providing enhanced oversight—serve as 
an important supplement to the contract monitors. Thus, at a minimum, it is 
essential that government agencies devote enough resources to ensure that 
these requirements are implemented in a meaningful way. In addition, outside 
independent non-governmental organizations, both for-profit and non-profit, 
can serve an important function by monitoring contracts.  
Contracts for services in the domestic context regularly include this 
three-tiered monitoring structure: government personnel assigned as contract 
monitors, supplemented by agency actors such as ombudspersons, further 
supplemented by independent outside groups. In the privatized health care 
context, for example, where private nursing homes receive Medicaid funding 
and private hospitals receive Medicare and Medicaid support, the trend is 
toward agreements that require a state-appointed contract manager.149 Federal 
agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services (whose 
Inspector General issues reports on contracts with private hospitals that 
receive public funding 150 ) and the Health Care Financing Administration 
(which exerts fairly tight control over private nursing homes receiving 
Medicaid funding151) also have significant oversight authority. In addition, 
third-party independent organizations play an important role. For example, the 
Joint Commission on Health Care and Accreditation of Health Organizations 
(JCAHO), a private organization of professional associations, certifies health 
care institutions for compliance with federal regulations and state licensure 
laws.152
 Foreign affairs contracts currently provide for far less monitoring. To be 
sure, the statutory and regulatory scheme includes provisions for 
governmental contract monitors, supplemented by inspectors general of the 
respective agencies responsible for the contracts,153 as well as for auditing of 
                                                                                                                               
 
 149. Freeman, supra note 18, at 608-09.  
 150. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE EXTERNAL 
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contracts by independent private accounting firms.154 Yet, the work of these 
monitors focuses primarily on whether the contractors are keeping adequate 
accounts and refraining from fraud and bribery. Contracts say little about 
human rights norms, and governmental contract monitors and ombudspersons 
are not ordinarily focused on these values when scrutinizing contractors.155 To 
the extent that independent third-party groups are empowered to monitor 
under the contract, they tend to be auditing firms, whose expertise lies in 
financial matters, not in international human rights or humanitarian law. 
Foreign affairs contracts rarely, if ever, provide for monitoring by independent 
groups with expertise in this area.156  
 Moreover, in practice, foreign affairs contracts tend to escape even this 
limited oversight. This is because many of the monitoring requirements tend 
not to apply in emergency situations, which are, of course, precisely the 
occasions when military intervention or humanitarian relief efforts and post-
reconstruction aid are most likely. Thus, ordinary contracting procedures, such 
as competitive bidding, are often waived.157 In addition, many of the contracts 
are written as cost reimbursement contracts, often termed “cost-plus” 
agreements, under which the government reimburses the contractor for costs 
incurred in providing a service, plus a fee that is calculated as a percentage of 
the cost.158 Though often criticized as leading to waste and abuse,159 such 
contracts become the norm in emergency situations, rather than the exception. 
At the same time, too few contract monitors are appointed, those who are 
                                                                                                                               
mission is to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in their respective departments and agencies 
across the executive branch.” Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector 
General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2027 (1998). For an analysis of the role that inspectors general play 
in various agencies, see id. 
 154. See USAID, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT 13 (2004), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/semiann/sarc0409.pdf. 
 155. After a scandal, however, such as the uproar surrounding revelations of abuse at Abu 
Ghraib prison, ombudspersons may be enlisted to investigate such problems.  
 156. A model for this type of oversight might be the role that the International Committee on 
the Red Cross (ICRC) currently plays in monitoring the conduct of governmental actors during armed 
conflict. The Geneva Conventions require states parties to allow ICRC representatives to visit military 
detention centers to ensure that detainees are treated in accord with the principles of international human 
rights and humanitarian law. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 126, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 98, arts. 76, 143. 
Yet, it is at best ambiguous whether the ICRC would be empowered to play a similar role with respect to 
private security contractors. The contracts could make this role explicit. 
 157. In practice, one way these requirements are avoided is through the use of blanket purchase 
order agreements, in which task orders can be issued under pre-existing contracts. See WINNING 
CONTRACTORS, supra note 131, and accompanying text. For criticism of the lack of open bidding on the 
Iraq contracts, see CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, REBUILDING IRAQ—THE CONTRACTORS, 
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/rebuilding_iraq/index.asp. For an opposing view, see 
Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, USAID’s Procurement Contracts: Insider’s View, 39 PROCUREMENT LAW 
10 (2003). 
 158. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.301-16.307 (2006). 
 159. Under the cost-plus system, companies have an incentive to inflate the costs of services so 
that their fee, typically measured as a percentage of this cost, is as high as possible, see Laura Peterson, 
Outsourcing Government: Service Contracting Has Risen Dramatically in the Last Decade, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=68 
[hereinafter Outsourcing Government], although such contracts do contain a cost ceiling that cannot be 
exceeded without the contracting officer’s approval. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1 (2005). Under the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), these contracts can only be utilized when costs cannot be estimated with 
sufficient accuracy. Id. § 16.301-2.  
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appointed lack expertise, and ombudspersons are not given the resources they 
need to do an effective job.  
 The monitoring of the Iraq contracts, or virtual lack thereof, provides a 
salient example. The government agencies with responsibility for the 
contracts—primarily USAID, the DOD, and the now dismantled Coalition 
Provisional Authority—devoted extraordinarily minimal resources to 
monitoring.160 For example, USAID has responsibility for approximately $3 
billion in reconstruction projects,161 but the agency had only four contract 
monitoring personnel on the ground as of March 2003.162 In fact, due to the 
difficulties of monitoring contracts with so little staff, USAID determined to 
contract out the monitoring function itself! 163  Likewise, a recent DOD 
Inspector General study concluded that more than half of the Iraq contracts 
had not been adequately monitored.164 This fact is not surprising given that 
DOD’s acquisition workforce was reduced by more than half between 1990 
and 2001, while the department’s contracting workload increased by more 
than twelve percent. 165  In addition, those who were assigned to monitor 
contract performance were often inadequately trained.166 Finally, in an ironic 
twist, private contractors themselves are often hired to write the procedural 
rules governing contracting rules and monitoring protocols, thus leading to 
further conflict-of-interest problems. Indeed, the DOD handbook on the 
contracting process was drafted by one of its principal military contractors.167  
The CPA was plagued with similar problems. A recent report notes that 
the CPA hadn’t kept accounts for the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash 
in its vault, had awarded contracts worth billions of dollars to American firms 
without tender, and had no idea what was happening to the money from the 
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) which was being spent by the interim Iraqi 
government ministries.168  
One former CPA official has observed that, as a result of poor oversight, 
“contracts were made that were mistakes, and were poorly, if at all, supervised 
[and] money was spent that could have been saved, if we simply had the right 
numbers of people.”169 For example, even devoting a single staff person to the 
                                                                                                                               
 
 160. For a searing indictment of the government’s failure to oversee military contractors and 
that failure’s role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, see Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu 
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 167. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 123-24. 
 168. Ed Harriman, Where Has All the Money Gone?, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, July 7, 2005, at 
4, 5. 
 169. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4. 
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two $16 million Custer Battles contracts that gave rise to multiple instances of 
fraud and abuse170 would have saved at least $4 million.171  
Finally, the dispersal of authority to issue foreign affairs contracts across 
multiple agencies creates interagency communication problems and conflicts 
of interest that impede oversight. 172  For example, officials at different 
agencies use different methods to calculate the costs of contracts, and these 
methods may also vary from those used by the companies themselves.173 In 
addition, because agencies can earn fees for facilitating other agencies’ 
contracts but are not adequately held to account for monitoring those 
contracts, agencies have incentives to sponsor other agencies’ contracts but 
little incentive to supervise them.174 These arrangements can lead to abuse, as 
occurred in the case of the Department of the Interior sponsorship of DOD’s 
task orders for intelligence services at Abu Ghraib prison under an existing 
contract between CACI and the Interior Department.175
In short, the foreign affairs contracts could provide far better protections 
for public law values through greater monitoring. Although the statutory and 
regulatory regime contemplates a combination of supervision by contract 
monitors, independent agency oversight through inspectors general, and 
limited financial auditing by third-party entities, these provisions have not 
worked well in practice due to insufficient staffing and resources, combined 
with the large number of contracts. To be sure, statutory and regulatory 
reforms could address these problems. But, alternatively, the contracts 
themselves could remedy these deficiencies to some extent, by specifying 
greater numbers of monitors and requiring that they possess a certain degree 
of training, as well as by allowing for independent oversight by third-party 
groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  
D. Laying Out Clear Performance Benchmarks 
Of course, to some degree increased contract monitoring can only be 
effective to the extent that the contracts have clear benchmarks against which 
to measure compliance. In the domestic context, commentators and 
policymakers have long urged that contracts include benchmarks, and rigorous 
performance standards regularly appear in contracts.176 Scholars have argued 
that, ideally, performance-based contracts should “clearly spell out the desired 
                                                                                                                               
 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 115-117 
 171. See generally SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 24 (statement of Franklin Willis). Of 
course, the lack of oversight may have a more cynical explanation: it permits private contractors (who 
may have powerful connections within government) to reap profits without significant constraints. 
 172. The DOD has taken more and more control over reconstruction and emergency relief 
functions, normally the province of USAID. See Contracts and Reports, supra note 135. The State 
Department, meanwhile, manages the contract with DynCorp to provide Iraqi police training. Id. And 
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assistance funds.  
 173. WINNING CONTRACTORS, supra note 131. 
 174. Schooner, supra note 160, at 564-70 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., HARRY P. HATRY, URBAN INST., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: GETTING 
RESULTS 3-10 (1999). 
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end result” but leave the choice of method to the contractor, who should have 
“as much freedom as possible in figuring out how to best meet government’s 
performance objective.”177  
These ideas have been implemented most notably in contracts with 
private prisons. For example, under the model contract for private prison 
management drafted by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, contractors 
must meet such delineated standards for security, meals, and education.178 
They must also certify that the training provided to personnel is comparable to 
that offered to state employees.179 In Texas, contractors must abide by similar 
terms and, in addition, must “establish performance measures for 
rehabilitative programs.” 180  In addition, the American Correctional 
Association is revising its accreditation standards to include performance 
measures, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is 
developing performance-based standards for juvenile correctional facilities.181 
Commentators have noted, further, that performance measures for private 
prison operators could include both  
process measures such as the number of educational or vocational programs, or outcome 
measures such as the Logan quality of confinement index, the number of assaults, or the 
recidivism rate. . . . Because no single statistic adequately captures ‘quality,’ and because 
focusing on any single measure could have perverse effects, performance-based contracts 
should tie compensation to a large and rich set of variables.182
Privatized welfare programs have also experimented with performance 
measures as a means to improve quality. In 1996, Congress authorized the 
implementation of welfare programs “through contracts with charitable, 
religious, or private organizations.”183 Since then, states have increasingly 
contracted with such organizations,184 and many of these contracts contain 
performance benchmarks and output requirements. 185 For example, under a 
performance-based system, a welfare contractor might receive financial 
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rewards for increasing the percentage of program participants who receive job 
placements.186
The foreign affairs contracts are notably less rigorous in providing for 
performance measures. Although military service contracts are difficult to 
evaluate because so many of them are not publicly available, contract officers 
familiar with the contracts have remarked on their generally vague terms.187 
And the fact that they are often indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) 
contracts adds to their open-ended quality. 188  Under this structure, the 
government awards a contract that does not specify how many services or 
goods will be necessary or the dates upon which they will be required.189 
These additional details are specified in subsequent task orders, which 
themselves are often vague because the task orders need not pass though the 
same degree of supervision as the initial contract award.190 Of course, such 
contracts may sometimes be necessary, because the government cannot know 
in advance precisely what will be required or for how long.191 Yet the lack of 
any administrable standards in these contracts can lead to significant 
abuses.192
 Of the publicly available Iraq contracts for military services, it is striking 
that none contains clear benchmarks or output requirements. Instead, they are 
phrased in amorphous language that provides little opportunity for compliance 
evaluation. For example, a contract between the U.S. government and MPRI 
to provide translators for government personnel, including interrogators, 
simply provides that the contractors will supply interpreters.193 The agreement 
says nothing about whether the interpreters must be effective or how 
effectiveness might be measured. 194  Similarly, the CACI task orders for 
interrogators specify only that CACI will provide interrogation support and 
analysis work for the U.S. Army in Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel, 
intelligence report writing, and screening/interrogation of detainees at 
established holding areas.”195 Other than these broad goals, the task orders say 
little more. To be sure, security concerns may require some degree of 
vagueness. Nonetheless, the task orders could be much more specific about 
training requirements, standards of conduct, supervision, and performance 
parameters. 
 Turning to the foreign aid context, agencies tend to promote the use of 
results-based agreements, under which contractors must demonstrate specific, 
                                                                                                                               
 
 186. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1387-88. 
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tangible results that are to be evaluated by the agency.196 Yet in practice many 
such agreements do not actually contain any results-based requirements, often 
because the aid, particularly in emergency relief settings, is provided on an 
expedited basis to organizations with very small staffs. With regard to Iraq, 
for example, a review of the publicly available USAID agreements reveals 
that only a few set forth specific performance benchmarks or requirements.197
 To be sure, performance benchmarks that are too strict can pose 
problems. As scholars of domestic privatization have noted, discretion can 
serve useful goals; indeed, discretion is in part what makes privatization 
desirable, as private contractors have more flexibility than rulebound 
bureaucratic actors to pursue innovative approaches.198 Output requirements 
that preserve flexibility about the means to achieve those results are therefore 
the most effective.199 But even carefully tailored output requirements can go 
awry, as when, for example, private welfare providers “cream” those accepted 
into their programs in order to increase the percentage of those who receive 
job placements. 200  Moreover, output requirements can sometimes give 
contractors tunnel vision, leading them to focus only on the benchmarks, 
thereby missing opportunities to achieve wider benefits. A recent study of the 
enhanced “auditing” that accompanied privatization in Thatcherite Britain, for 
example, suggests that narrow output requirements steered organizations and 
individuals away from broader, more diffuse, social goals.201  
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 In addition, by their very nature, results-based contracts raise difficult 
questions about how best to measure output. Creating benchmarks may be 
relatively straight-forward if the project at issue involves simply building a 
bridge or dam, but it is very difficult to measure intangibles, such as fostering 
human development or building civil society.202 Likewise, short-term results, 
such as whether food aid was delivered, are much easier to measure than 
longer-term systemic efforts to alleviate poverty, provide education, and so 
on. As a consequence, results-based contracts tend to put more emphasis on 
short-term delivery of services rather than longer-term impact.203  Finally, 
contractual output requirements do not, of course, necessarily ensure 
compliance because contractors may simply fail to meet their goals. In 
addition, even the most detailed performance requirements and standards 
inevitably leave considerable discretion to the contractor.204  
 Nonetheless, despite problems with overly rigid performance 
benchmarks, the foreign affairs contracts (at least those that are publicly 
available) appear to fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Indeed, they 
possess so few benchmarks and output requirements that they contain no 
meaningful evaluative criteria whatsoever. In such circumstances, enhanced 
performance benchmarks could be a useful contractual tool.  
E.  Requiring that Contractors Receive Accreditation from Independent 
Organizations 
Another contract-based tool for promoting public law values is 
accreditation. Independent organizations, often consisting of experts or 
professionals in the field, can evaluate and rate private contractors. These 
ratings can then be used in the contracting process because agreements can 
require that contractors receive certain rankings. Or, governmental entities or 
international institutions, such as the United Nations, could develop 
accreditation regimes. 
Again, the domestic context offers a particularly rich set of examples 
that could provide useful lessons in the foreign affairs setting. For example, in 
the field of publicly funded, privately provided health care, JCAHO accredits 
hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding. Indeed, such 
accreditation is required by statute as well as by contract.205 State laws or 
contractual terms also often specify that health maintenance organizations 
must receive accreditation by the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA), an independent non-profit organization, before receiving public 
funding. 206  Until recently, NCQA certification was primarily voluntary, 
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offering health maintenance organizations an advantage when competing for 
lucrative health care delivery contracts. When states became managed care 
purchasers, however, they adopted NCQA as a benchmark of quality.207  
Similarly, many contracts with private prison operators require 
companies to receive accreditation by the American Correctional Association 
(ACA).208 An organization of correctional professionals that has existed for 
over a century, the ACA accredits prisons and provides training for prison 
personnel while also setting standards that apply to virtually every aspect of 
prison operation. 209  Not only has ACA accreditation become a standard 
contract requirement, 210  but federal courts have used ACA standards to 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.211 Even private investors look 
to accreditation as an indication of quality. 212  Thus, the accreditation 
requirement creates significant compliance incentives. 
Privatized education regimes such as charter schools have also 
considered accreditation by independent organizations as a means of ensuring 
quality.213  The focus of many independent organizations on facilities and 
administrative processes over underlying educational quality has led some 
critics to charge that educational accreditation is relatively ineffective. 214  
Nonetheless, commentators have advocated improved accreditation 
procedures and greater use of such accreditation to promote public law 
values.215
Indeed, domestic administrative law scholars have noted that these 
independent, private accrediting entities are effectively setting the standards 
that give meaning to public law values.216 In that regard, the relative insularity 
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of the standard-setting and accreditation process may undermine the ability of 
broader groups, including consumers and the public at large, to participate in 
the process.217 There is also the concern that private accreditors in some cases 
might be too close to the contractors, and therefore too lenient. 218  
Nevertheless, even critics agree that the standards are often much better than 
those that would be developed by agency bureaucrats, and despite the 
imperfections, accreditation has served as an important check on the 
contracting process.219  
In contrast, accreditation is glaringly absent in the foreign affairs 
context.220 Human rights organizations, governments, and the United Nations 
have begun to encourage corporations, particularly those in the extraction 
industries, to comply with voluntary labor, environmental, and human rights 
standards.221 A consortium of NGOs that deliver humanitarian relief have 
initiated the SPHERE project, which is an effort to set standards for the 
provision of humanitarian aid, including specific guidelines for field 
operations, training, and self evaluation. 222  And an industry-founded 
association of private security companies, the International Peace Officers 
Association (IPOA), has begun to construct a comprehensive code of conduct 
that includes human rights standards.223 Nevertheless, neither the U.N., nor 
domestic governments, nor outside groups concerned with potential abuses by 
foreign affairs contractors have so far undertaken serious efforts either to 
harness these nascent accreditation initiatives or to promote other 
accreditation projects. 
This failure is particularly striking in the Iraq context. Not one of the 
available contracts for aid or military services requires that the entities 
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receiving the contracts be vetted or accredited by independent organizations. 
For example, unlike domestic prison contracts, which routinely require 
accreditation by ACA and compliance with a comprehensive set of standards, 
the contracts with CACI to provide interrogators at Abu Ghraib contain only 
the most basic guidelines and make no mention of human rights compliance or 
accreditation requirements.224 The contract between the U.S. government and 
Dyncorp to provide law enforcement advisers to train Iraqi police similarly 
contains no provision mandating that Dyncorp be accredited,225 even though 
Dyncorp employees were implicated in sex abuse when performing under a 
similar contract in Bosnia.226 Likewise, although contracts could require that 
humanitarian aid organizations agree to the SPHERE guidelines in order to 
receive contracts, no such requirement has been imposed.227
Yet, such accreditation would seem to be particularly important in the 
foreign affairs area, where, as discussed previously, security concerns and 
special considerations often eliminate competition in the contracting process, 
resulting in contracts that are structured without the usual market controls. 
Significantly, the problem is not only that international organizations and 
domestic governments neglect to require accreditation in their contracts, but 
also that NGOs and other independent groups have not sought a robust 
accreditation role. After all, more NGOs could, like the SPHERE Project’s 
efforts in humanitarian aid, begin to rate military contractors independently, 
regardless of whether the government contracts require such accreditation. 
These ratings might then become an industry standard that the government 
could be persuaded to use as a contracting factor. This is what occurred with 
NCQA in the domestic health care context. And, even if agency officials 
negotiating contracts choose not to impose accreditation requirements, the 
ratings could serve as a point of pressure in Congress and the public at large. 
Thus, NGOs should spend at least as much energy developing accreditation 
regimes as they do pursuing transnational litigation under various formal 
international law instruments. International organizations could also seek to 
create accreditation regimes. Such accreditation would likely be influential 
over time, even if states at first formally refuse to implement accreditation 
requirements into their contracts. 
F. Mandating Contractor Self-Evaluation 
Contractors could also be required to perform self-evaluations as a way 
of enhancing accountability. Presented with an internal self-evaluation, an 
outside monitor, whether governmental or third-party, can often scrutinize the 
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contractor’s performance more quickly and efficiently. Of course, self-
evaluation gives the contractor discretion to massage the data and indeed can 
be subject to outright manipulation and abuse.228 But nonetheless, it can be a 
useful starting point for outside monitors, who can at least at the outset make a 
faster assessment as to whether the contractor has met the contract goals. In 
addition, self-evaluation can encourage more effective internal policing by the 
contractor.  
Due to these potential benefits, self-evaluation has emerged as a frequent 
tool in the domestic context. In the world of private prisons, for example, 
contractors regularly are subjected to self-evaluation requirements. In Texas, 
prison contractors must “establish performance measures for rehabilitative 
programs and develop a system to assess achievement and outcomes.”229  
Likewise in the field of health care, a health maintenance organization must, if 
it is to receive accreditation, conduct continuous “quality improvement,” in an 
ongoing internal self-evaluation process. 230  Contracts that require 
accreditation thus effectively mandate such self-evaluation.  
In the foreign affairs context, private foreign aid providers operating 
under agreement with USAID are regularly required to perform self-
evaluation, but foreign aid contracts provided through other agencies and 
military contracts seem to be devoid of such provisions. Again, taking the 
publicly available Iraq contracts as an example, none requires the private 
contractor to file self-evaluation reports, develop internal assessment 
practices, or otherwise engage in self-evaluation.231 And while self-evaluation 
on its own is unlikely to significantly improve contract compliance, such self-
evaluation can be useful in combination with some or all of the other 
contractual provisions discussed in this Article. 
G.  Enhancing Governmental Termination Provisions and Allowing for 
Partial Governmental Takeover of Contracts 
 Contracts could also include terms allowing the relevant government (or 
international organization) to take over the contract by degrees before 
ultimately terminating the agreement for failure to observe provisions 
implementing public law values. Currently, most contracts have implied or 
explicit provisions allowing only for outright termination for noncompliance. 
On its face this sort of termination provision seems as if it would provide a 
strong incentive for contractor compliance. In actual practice, however, 
outright termination is such an extreme measure that governments are often 
reluctant to invoke it, and because contractors know that termination is so 
unlikely, the provisions have almost no disciplining effect.  
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 Thus, it would be better if such termination provisions were 
supplemented with more graduated penalties, such as provisions permitting 
the partial governmental takeover of contracts. Because graduated penalties 
are less extreme than outright termination, they are far more likely actually to 
be invoked by contract monitors, making them a more effective enforcement 
mechanism than the harsher (though rarely invoked) termination provisions. 
Moreover, if partial takeover fails to stem the abuses, outright termination still 
remains a penalty of last resort. In the domestic context, states are increasingly 
turning to mechanisms such as graduated penalties, for example, to increase 
oversight of private nursing homes receiving public funding.232 Scholars and 
practitioners have also called for the use of such penalties in the private prison 
setting.233
Turning to foreign affairs, while contracts subject to the FAR do contain 
termination provisions, they are rarely exercised and are not supplemented by 
lesser, graduated penalties. As a result, the government has little leverage over 
contractors. The Iraq contracts provide a notable demonstration of this 
problem. When CACI employees were implicated in abuses at Abu Ghraib 
prison, for example, the U.S. government did not terminate its contract. 
Indeed, although the particular employees implicated in the abuse charges no 
longer work at CACI,234 it is unclear whether government actors even so 
much as stepped up their supervision of the contracts. To the contrary, CACI 
actually received a contract extension for interrogation services.235  
Obviously, governments (and international organizations) should be 
encouraged to invoke termination provisions when contractors fall short. But 
even without full termination of the contractors, graduated government (or 
international organization) takeover could provide an added incentive for 
contractors to promote public law values. 
H.  Allowing for Beneficiary Participation or Broader Public Involvement in 
Contract Design 
 Contracts could also permit beneficiaries or the broader public to help 
shape contract terms and evaluate performance. In the domestic context, 
commentators have suggested that such beneficiary participation or 
involvement by the broader public could greatly enhance the extent to which 
contractors fulfill public law values.236 Indeed, as Fred Aman has argued, 
precisely because privatization contracts are difficult to terminate and 
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sometimes become “immutable,” it is “important that the participation of the 
public and the public’s representatives be maximized as early in the process as 
possible.”237 He thus advocates allowing the broader public to play a role in 
the design of the contracts themselves.238  
Some state and local governments have begun to do so. For example, 
Wisconsin’s contracts with managed care organizations to provide health care 
to Medicare and Medicaid recipients include provisions for participation by 
community groups.239 Other states have gone even further and now require 
broad public involvement in virtually all privatization decisions. In Montana, 
for example, any privatization decision must be made subject to a plan 
available to the public and open to public comment.240 Other states have 
similar provisions.241  
Foreign affairs contracts might benefit from this approach. Indeed, such 
participation may be particularly important to promote public law values 
because the ordinary democratic process open to those experiencing the 
effects of privatization in the domestic context is essentially unavailable for 
non-citizens outside the United States who are affected by the activities of 
contractors. To be sure, even in the domestic context, there has long been a 
worry that privatization removes a crucial democratic check on government. 
The link between those affected by government action and the government 
actors is attenuated when that activity is farmed out first from legislatures to 
agencies, and then from agencies to private contractors. Scholars and policy-
makers worry that this form of delegation reduces transparency, which in turn 
reduces the ability of those affected to vote their preferences when things are 
not going well. 242  But when governments turn to private contractors to 
perform foreign affairs functions, the problem is increased exponentially 
because many of the people affected by the contracts in question do not 
belong to the U.S. democratic polity or indeed any democratic polity at all. 
Moreover, U.S. citizens may be less inclined to use the democratic process to 
voice their views when the effects of contracting are felt mainly overseas.  
While it may make less sense to allow involvement of those non-citizens 
affected by military contractors overseas, due to obvious security concerns, 
beneficiary involvement or broader public participation in the design and 
evaluation of foreign aid contracts might be particularly useful. Governments 
providing long-term development aid through private organizations have to 
some degree already begun to adopt this approach. In the United States, 
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USAID has allowed local beneficiaries and NGOs to help design development 
aid agreements, usually on an informal basis, and most frequently when such 
agreements are negotiated through field offices. 243  Agencies other than 
USAID, however, are less likely to engage in such consultation. 244  
Humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction assistance are also less 
likely to incorporate such an approach, though recently the UNHCR has 
begun to explore the possibility of refugee and internally displaced person 
evaluation of humanitarian aid.245  
I must leave to a future article a more detailed discussion of how best to 
maximize opportunities for those affected by a foreign aid project to 
participate in the design of that project.246 Certainly, the idea raises a whole 
host of practical problems. For example, it will be difficult to determine who 
exactly can speak for an affected population. Is NGO participation sufficient? 
How does one determine which civil society actors are most representative? 
What if different sectors of the population disagree as to the efficacy of a 
proposed project? Even assuming one determines the appropriate voices, what 
form should the feedback take? Is informal consultation enough? Or should 
there be a more formal notice and comment period? Or is it necessary to 
establish an independent tribunal with the power to quash the project 
altogether? And should such a tribunal be governmental or private? While 
these questions certainly must be addressed, it seems to me that if we are 
asking them, we will have already advanced the debate quite a bit. The 
important point for now is that we must at the very least begin to explore ways 
of involving in the contracting process itself those affected by foreign affairs 
agreements. Explicit contractual requirements would go a long way toward 
facilitating consultation with beneficiary populations, thereby effectuating 
through contract a broader form of public participation.  
I. Strengthening Enforcement Mechanisms 
Finally, the contracts could provide for enhanced enforcement 
mechanisms. They could, for example, give beneficiaries the opportunity for 
privatized administrative hearings. Additionally, contracts might include 
third-party beneficiary suit provisions, empowering contract beneficiaries or 
other interested parties to sue in domestic courts for breach of contract. And 
whistleblower protections might be enhanced. All of these measures would 
likely increase compliance with contractual terms.  
 In the domestic context, governments and policymakers have begun to 
implement such measures, though private grievance procedures remain more 
prevalent than broader third-party beneficiary suit provisions and 
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whistleblower protections. Commentators regularly call for an expansion of 
third-party beneficiary suit provisions247 (which courts generally refuse to 
imply unless clearly specified in the contract),248 but such provisions remain 
rare. Many private contractors providing aid, however, do offer individual 
complaint mechanisms for affected beneficiaries. 249  Although these aid 
providers are not state actors and would therefore generally be immune from 
constitutional review, such contractual provisions do allow for notice and 
opportunity to be heard, thereby incorporating elements of constitutional due 
process. These private grievance systems are perhaps most evident in 
contracts with private prison operators, which typically require such 
mechanisms.250 But they appear in other contexts as well, such as health care. 
For example, the Medicare statute requires that health maintenance 
organizations receiving federal funding to cover their treatment of Medicare 
beneficiaries must “provide meaningful procedures for hearing and resolving 
grievances between the organization . . . and members enrolled.”251  
 Governments might experiment with similar measures in the foreign 
affairs arena.252 The World Bank has taken steps in this direction, by enabling 
aid beneficiaries to bring grievances before special tribunals challenging gross 
abuses.253 Third-party beneficiary suit provisions, however, are virtually non-
existent, and none of the Iraq contracts contains such a provision. 
Whistleblower protections should also be enhanced. Government officials 
currently receive whistleblower protection for reporting abuses in the 
negotiation or management of contracts, but employees of private companies 
are not protected under the general Whistleblower Protection Act. 254  In 
specific statutes, however, Congress has at times extended whistleblower 
protection to private employees. For example, seven of the major federal 
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environmental statutes contain such whistleblower clauses. 255  Thus, 
whistleblower protection could also be extended to private sector employees 
working for a government contractor, who provide information concerning the 
unlawful performance of a contract. Such a provision, combined with the 
availability of third-party beneficiary suits, or possibly even qui tam 
actions,256 would go a long way towards making sure that any contract-based 
efforts to provide accountability will have back-end enforcement to encourage 
compliance.  
 As discussed previously, enforcing international law norms through 
contract, rather than directly in an international forum, obviates any need to 
argue that the contractor should be deemed a state actor. In addition, because 
international law enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak compared to 
their domestic counterparts, a contractual approach is far more likely to lead 
to meaningful judicial review. In addition, requiring domestic judges to 
enforce international public law values embodied in contracts may have 
important norm internalization effects because such judges would essentially 
be enforcing international law norms. 257  This increased familiarity with 
international law principles might lead to less resistance to those norms as a 
general matter, thereby effectively expanding the reach of international law. 
 On the other hand, one might argue that localizing the enforcement of 
international law norms might either cause international enforcement 
mechanisms to atrophy from disuse or lead to heterogeneity in different 
countries’ understandings of the principles, which could undermine the notion 
of a common international law. Neither objection, however, should create 
serious hesitation about pursuing contractual accountability. First, as 
previously discussed, international law enforcement mechanisms are already 
weak, and to the extent that they have been effective, at least in the human 
rights context, it has been by selectively limiting the scope of enforcement to 
the very most egregious human rights violators. Thus, it is not at all clear that 
providing a possibly effective domestic avenue for pursuing claims against 
private actors (who would have been unlikely to face prosecution 
internationally in any event) will in any meaningful way undermine 
international law institutions. Second, to the extent that domestic judicial 
systems, government officials, and broader populations internalize 
international law norms, it strikes me that the benefits of such norm 
internalization far outweigh any possible concern about maintaining the 
“purity” of the international norm. Local variation is to be expected, of course, 
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but such hetereogeneity in the domestic incorporation of international norms 
strikes me as a strength, not a weakness. Finally, the key point is that without 
focusing on contracts, there may be no realistic way to impose norms of 
accountability on privatized foreign affairs activity at all. Accordingly, those 
seeking to expand the applicability of international law norms should at the 
very least seriously consider using contractual enforcement mechanisms or 
risk the possibility that such norms will simply be ignored in an increasingly 
privatized world. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Resisting privatization in the foreign affairs context is probably no 
longer an option. Indeed, if anything the scope and pace of privatization in the 
international arena is increasing. Moreover, it will not be sufficient merely to 
tweak existing international law treaties or doctrines (or even invent new 
ones) in order to bring private contractors within the ambit of formal 
international law. After all, even if international or domestic courts could be 
convinced that private contractors should be held liable for violation of 
international law norms (which is far from certain), international and 
transnational public law litigation will never be able to hold accountable more 
than a handful of people. Accordingly, those who seek to preserve or expand 
the values embodied in public international law will also need to look 
elsewhere to find mechanisms for ensuring accountability in a privatized 
world. 
In this Article, I have suggested one such mechanism: the government 
contract that creates the privatized relationship in the first place. Drawing on 
the far more extensive domestic administrative law literature on the subject, I 
have identified a variety of provisions that could be incorporated into such 
contracts. These provisions seek to encourage compliance with (and 
enforcement of) human rights and humanitarian law, ensure transparency and 
democratic accountability, and promote norms against corruption, waste, and 
fraud. Taken together, they provide a menu of options for regulators, activists, 
policymakers, and scholars who are concerned at the potential for abuse in our 
current contracting processes.  
Of course, governments may be hesitant to insist on some of these 
contractual provisions. For example, officials may fear that such requirements 
could unduly increase the costs of privatization both to the contractor and to 
the government entity overseeing the contract. 258  Or, more cynically, 
resistance might stem from the fact that governments actually benefit from a 
more opaque process with less public oversight. In any event, one seeming 
difficulty with relying on contractual provisions is that the increased oversight 
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will be included in contracts only as a “matter of legislative or executive 
grace,” and therefore can be rescinded or limited at any time.259
Yet, such objections do not render a contractual approach unrealistic. To 
begin with, concerns about the cost of additional contractual requirements 
may well be over-stated. As the Custer Battles fiasco makes clear, in many 
cases better oversight could actually save the government far more money 
than it costs. And as to concerns that added contractual provisions will cause 
contractors to walk away or prohibitively raise their rates, the short answer is 
that far more empirical work must be done to assess whether such dire 
predictions are accurate. After all, it seems quite unlikely that contractors 
bidding for these extraordinarily lucrative contracts with governments such as 
the United States will pull out of the process just because of some added 
contract requirements. To the contrary, the government should, by all rights, 
have tremendous leverage in the contracting process because there are 
unlikely to be competing customers similarly able to offer billions of dollars 
in contract awards. Indeed, while government contractors in the past have 
often raised concerns about increased compliance costs to object to enhanced 
contractual oversight,260 at least one commentator has challenged such claims, 
noting the absence of compelling evidence that increased oversight through, 
for example, qui tam suits has resulted in a significant number of firms 
refusing to do business with the government.261  
In addition, while some governmental officials surely would prefer a 
more opaque process, governments are not monolithic entities, and proposals 
such as the ones outlined in this Article may be taken up and championed by 
members of the bureaucracy, even without the imprimatur of higher level 
executive branch officials or the legislature. Moreover, it is incorrect to think 
that more robust contractual monitoring can only come about through official 
executive branch or legislative action. First of all, some of the proposals for 
monitoring of contracts and accreditation or rating of contractors could be 
undertaken by NGOs or other groups without any official action whatsoever. 
While such evaluations might not initially have the power of the state behind 
them, the example of NCQA indicates that, over time, governments can be 
convinced to adopt a previously unofficial rating system as its own. Second, 
even if governments never adopted the standards, simply the process of 
evaluating and accrediting contractors would provide a rich source of public 
information about privatization that could be used to bring popular political 
(or economic) pressure to bear on noncompliant contractors. Such public 
reporting might also allow citizen watchdog groups (or even competing 
contractors) to monitor the effectiveness of particular contracts, publicize 
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deficiencies, and lobby government officials for change.262 Third, advocacy at 
the international level could result in treaties or other international regimes 
that actually require governments to include oversight provisions in certain 
categories of contracts, thus creating increasing pressure for change. In any 
event, as the domestic examples demonstrate, governments and agencies can, 
at least at times, be mobilized to require meaningful contractual oversight.  
In the end, whatever the drawbacks of a contractual approach, they are 
certainly no greater than the weaknesses of the existing formal 
transnational/international court system. Indeed, the use of contractual 
provisions has the benefit of opening up the possibility of legal enforcement 
regardless of whether or not there is state action and to provide the foundation 
for legal action in domestic, as well as international, fora. Such contractual 
mechanisms might also pave the way for statutes and treaties. Thus, 
international law scholars, activists, and advocates should spend at least as 
much time studying and lobbying for contract-based compliance regimes as 
they do seeking further openings for international or transnational litigation. 
Perhaps most importantly, we must remember that the proper 
management of privatization will almost certainly require a variety of 
approaches, and we need not choose one to the exclusion of others. My aim 
here is simply to focus attention on privatization in the international realm as a 
crucial field of study, to call for dialogue among international and domestic 
scholars, advocates, and policy-makers concerning appropriate responses, and 
to suggest that more attention be paid to the possibility of using contractual 
provisions to provide accountability. None of these aims requires that contract 
become the only response to privatization.263 To the contrary, in the coming 
years we will need to think broadly and creatively about how best to respond 
to the threats posed by the outsourcing of governmental functions to non-
governmental entities. Only through such efforts will we be able to find ways 
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to protect crucial public law values in the era of privatization that is already 
upon us. 
 
